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Electronic Journal of Biotechnology
Universidad Católica de Valparaíso
ISSN: 0717-3458
Vol. 2, Num. 3, 1999, pp. 99-129
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Electronic Journal of Biotechnology, Vol. 2, No. 3, December,
1999 INVITED REVIEW ARTICLE Biological
warfare, bioterrorism, biodefence and the biological and toxin weapons convention
Edgar
J. DaSilva Director,
Division of Life Sciences UNESCO, France E-Mail: e.dasilva@unesco.org Code
Number: ej99014 Abstract Biological
warfare is the intentional use of micro-organisms, and toxins, generally of microbial,
plant or animal origin to produce disease and death in humans, livestock and crops.
The attraction of bioweapons in war, and for use in terroristic attacks is attributed
to easy access to a wide range of disease-producing biological agents, to their
low production costs, to their non-detection by routine security systems, and
to their easy transportation from one place to another. In addition, novel and
accessible technologies give rise to proliferation of such weapons that have implications
for regional and global security. In counteraction of such threats, and in securing
the culture and defence of peace, the need for leadership and example in devising
preventive and protective strategies has been emphasised through international
consultation and co-operation. Adherence to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
reinforced by confidence-building measures sustained by use of monitoring and
verification protocols, is indeed, an important and necessary step in reducing
and eliminating the threats of biological warfare and bioterrorism. Keywords:
Biodefence, Biosensors, Bioterrorism,
Biowarfare, Robobiology, and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Article
Biological warfare is
the intentional use of micro-organisms, and toxins, generally, of microbial, plant
or animal origin to produce disease and/or death in humans, livestock and crops.
The attraction for bioweapons in war, and for use in terroristic attacks is attributed
to their low production costs, The easy access to a wide range of disease-producing
biological agents, their non-detection by routine security systems, and their
easy transportation from one location to another are other attractive features
(Atlas, 1998). Their properties of invisibility and virtual weightlessness
render detection and verification procedures ineffectual and make non-proliferation
of such weapons impossibility. Consequently, national security decision-makers
defence professionals, and security personnel will increasingly be confronted
by biological warfare as it unfolds in the battlefields of the future (Schneider
and Grintner, 1995). Current
concerns regarding the use of bioweapons result from their production for use
in the 1991 Gulf War; and from the increasing number of countries that are engaged
in the proliferation of such weapons i.e. from about four in the mid-1970s to
about 17 today (Cole, 1996, 1997). A similar
development has been observed with the proliferation of chemical weapons i.e.
from about 4 countries in the recent past to some 20 countries in the mid-1990s
(Hoogendorn,1997). Other
alarming issues are the contamination of the environment resulting from dump burial
(Miller, 1999), the use of disease-producing micro-organisms
in terroristic attacks on civilian populations; and non-compliance with the 1972
Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (Table 1).
The diverse roles of micro-organisms interacting with humans as "pathogens and
pals" has been described with Leishmania infections, and with the presence
of Bacteroides thetaiotaomicron in the intestines of humans and mice (Strauss,
1999). Also the development of "battle strains" of anthrax, bubonic
plague, smallpox, Ebola virus, and of a microbe-based "double agent" has
been reported (Thompson, 1999). Table
1. Chronological summary of conventions, protocols and resolutions curbing biological
warfare
Year | Convention | Remarks |
1899 Hague, Netherlands* | The
Laws and Customs of War on Land (II) |
-
Entering into force in 1900, the Convention in defining the rules,
laws and customs of war, based on deliberation of the Brussels Peace Conference
of 1874, prohibited the use of poison and poisoned weapons as well as the use
of arms, projectiles and/or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering
|
| The
Laws and Customs of War on Land (IV) |
-
Entering into force in 1910, the Convention covers issues, and
customs in more detail, relating to belligerents, prisoners of war, the sick and
wounded, means of injuring the enemy, and bombardments, etc.
|
1925 Geneva, Switzerland | Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare |
-
In
force since 1928, the protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous
or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, and, the use
of bacteriological methods of warfare
|
1972 Geneva, Switzerland | Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction |
- prohibits
the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and retention of microbial
or other biological agents or toxins that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes -
their use as weapons, or in military equipment, missiles and other means of delivery
for hostile use or in armed conflict -
further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of
bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes
| 1974
Paris, France
| Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources |
-
prevention of pollution of the sea inclusive of marine estuaries, by humankind
either by direct or indirect means, through introduction of substances of
energy resulting in deleterious effects as hazards to human health, living marine
resources, marine ecosystems, and damage to amenities, or interference with other
legitimate uses of the sea
|
1976 Geneva,
U.N. | Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques |
-
Adopted by the Resolution 31/72 of the U.N. General Assembly on
10 December, 1976, and open for signature in Geneva, 18 May, 1877, the Convention
focuses on any technique that changes through deliberate manipulation of natural
processes-- the dynamics, the composition or structure of the Earth, including
its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space
|
1981
Abidjan, Cote dIvoire
| Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment
of the West and Central African Region |
- the marine environment, coastal zones, and related inland
waters within the jurisdiction of the States of the West and Central African Region
- the introduction,
directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, coastal
zones, and related inland waters resulting in deleterious effects that harm living
resources, endanger human health, obstruct marine activities (inclusive of fishing)
and alters the quality and use of seawater and reduction of amenities.
- promotes scientific and technological co-operation to monitor
and assess direct and/or indirect pollution, and to engage in networking exchange
of scientific data and technical information.
|
1983
Bonn, Germany
| Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil and Other Harmful
Substances | -
Agreement, by the governments of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the U.K., and the European Economic Community,
based on an agreement reached in Bonn, 1969, covers
- prevention
of pollution of the sea by oil and other hazardous substances - development of mutual assistance and co-operation in combating
marine pollution and destruction of marine bioresources
|
1989
Basle, Switzerland
| Control
of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
| -
Known
as the Basel Convention, it entered into force in 1992, and covers a variety of
hazardous wastes resulting from wastes such as clinical wastes, household wastes,
radioactive wastes, and toxic wastes resulting from the production of biological,
medicines, the chemical industry, etc.***
|
1991 Bamako, Mali | Ban
of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management
of Hazardous Wastes with Africa |
- need to promote the development of clean production methods,
including clean technologies, for the sound management of hazardous wastes produced
in Africa, in particular, to avoid, minimise, and eliminate the generation of
such wastes - protection, through strict control, the human health of
the African population against the adverse effects which may result from the generation
and movement of hazardous wastes within the African Continent.
|
1992 Bucharest, Romania | Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution |
- special hydrological and ecological characteristics of
the Black Sea, and the susceptibility of its flora and fauna to pollutants and
noxious wastes of biological and chemical origin resulting from disposal systems,
and dumping by aircraft and seaborne craft - need to develop co-operative scientific monitoring systems
to minimise and eliminate pollution of the Black Sea
|
1993 Geneva, Switzerland | Prohibition of the Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction |
-
Entering into force in 1997, the Convention prohibits the development,
production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of chemical weapons, their transfer,
directly or indirectly to anyone, as well as their use in any military preparations
or in missile delivery systems or weapons
| *
Year of the First International Peace
Conference based on invitations from Czar Nicholas II of Russia and Queen Wilhelmina
of the Netherlands.
** Year of the Second International Peace Conference. The Third
Conference scheduled for 1915 never took place due to outbreak of the First World
War. *** The reader is referred to Annexes I
V appended to the Treaty and which covers the range, categories and characteristics
of hazardous wastes and conditions concerning their transbound Biological/Chemical
warfare characteristics Biological,
chemical and nuclear weapons possess the common property of wreaking mass destruction.
Though biological warfare is different from chemical warfare, there has always
been the tendency to discuss one in terms of the other, or both together. This
wide practice probably arises from the fact that the victims of such warfare are
biological in origin unlike that in the Kosovo War in which destruction of civic
infrastructure, and large-scale disruption of routine facilities were the primary
goals, e.g. the loss of electricity supplies through the use of graphite bombs.
Another consideration is that several biological agents e.g., toxic metabolites
produced by either micro-organisms, animals or plants are also produced through
chemical synthesis. One of the main
goals of biological warfare is the undermining and destruction of economic progress
and stability. The emergence of bio-economic warfare as a weapon of mass destruction
can be traced to the development and use of biological agents against economic
targets such as crops, livestock and ecosystems. Furthermore, such warfare can
always be carried out under the pretexts that such traumatic occurrences are the
result of natural circumstances that lead to outbreaks of diseases and disasters
of either endemic or epidemic proportions. Biological
and chemical warfare share several common features. A rather comprehensive study
of the characteristics of chemical and biological weapons, the types of agents,
their acquisition and delivery has been made (Purver, 1995).
Formulae and recipes for experimenting and fabricating both types of weapons result
from increasing academic proficiency in biology, chemistry, engineering and genetic
manipulations. Both types of weapons, to date, have been used in bio- and chemoterroristic
attacks against small groups of individuals. Again, defence measures, such as
emergency responses to these types of terrorism, are unfamiliar and unknown. A
general state of helplessness resulting from a total lack of preparedness and
absence of decontaminating strategies further complicates the issue. The
widespread ability and interest of non-military personnel to engage in developing
chemical and biologically based weapons is linked directly to easy access to academic
excellence world-wide. Another factor is the tempting misuse of freely available
electronic data and knowledge concerning the production of antibiotics and vaccines,
and of conventional weapons with their varying details of sophistication. Several
other factors make biological agents more attractive for weaponization, and use
by terrorists in comparison to chemical agents (Table
2). Production of biological weapons has a higher cost efficiency index since
financial investments are not as massive as those required for the manufacture
of chemical and nuclear weapons. Again, lower casualty numbers are encountered
with bigger payloads of chemical and nuclear weapons in contrast to the much higher
numbers of the dead that result from the use of invisible and microgram payloads
of biological agents. Table
2. Biological
and chemical warfare characteristics
Biological |
Chemical
| | |
|
|
|
|
Pre-exposure
treatment confers or enhances immunity through use of toxoids, vaccines, antibacterial
protective clothing, biosensors and smoke-detectors |
|
|
|
|
Effects
of chemical agents are either instantaneous or delayed for a few hours, with the
onset of symptoms such as allergy, respiratory discomfort, intense irritation
of mucous membranes, malfunctioning of physiological processes, resulting in dose-dependent
death or incapacitation |
|
|
|
| | |
To a great
extent, application or delivery systems for biological agents differ with those
employed for chemical and nuclear weapons. With humans and animals, systems range
from the use of live vectors such as insects, pests and rodents to aerosol sprays
of dried spores and infective powders. In the case of plants, proliferation of
plant disease is carried out through delivery systems that use propagative material
such as contaminated seeds, plant and root tissue culture materials, organic carriers
such as soil and compost dressing, and use of water from contaminated garden reservoirs. In
terms of lethality, the most lethal chemical warfare agents cannot compare with
the killing power of the most lethal biological agents (Office of
Technology Assessment, 1993). Amongst all lethal weapons of mass destruction
-chemical, biological and nuclear, the ones most feared are bioweapons (Danzig
and Berkowsky, 1997). Biological
agents listed for use in weaponization and war are many. Those commonly identified
for prohibition by monitoring authorities are the causative agents of the bacterial
diseases anthrax and brucellosis; the rickettsial disease Q fever; the
viral disease Venezuela equine encephalitis (VEE), and several toxins such as
enterotoxin and botulinum toxin. As
a rule, microbiologists have pioneered research in the development of a bioarmoury
comprised of powerful antibiotics, antisera, toxoids and vaccines to neutralise
and eliminate a wide range of diseases. However, despite the use of biological
agents in military campaigns and wars (Christopher et al, 1997),
it is only since the mid-1980s that the attention of the military intelligence
has been attracted by the spectacular breakthroughs in the life sciences (Wright,
1985). Military interest, in harnessing genetic engineering and DNA recombinant
technology for updating and devising effective lethal bioweapons is spurred on
by the easy availability of funding, even in times of economic regression, for
contractual research leading to the development of: -
vaccines against a wide variety of bacteria and viruses identified in core control
and warning lists of biological agents used in biowarfare (Table
3)
- rapid detection,
identification and neutralisation of biological and chemical warfare agents
-
antidotes and antitoxins for use against
venoms, microbial toxins, and aerosol sprays of toxic biological agents
-
development of genetically-modified organisms
-
development of bioweapons with either incapacitating or lethal characteristics
-
development of poisons e.g. ricin, and contagious elements e.g. viruses, bacteria
-
development of antianimal agents e.g. rabbit calcivirus disease (RCD) to curb
overpopulation growth of rabbits in Australia and New Zealand
-
development of antiplant contagious agents e.g. causative agents of rust, smut,
etc.
Table
3. Control, Preventive and Monitoring Activities
Agency | Activity
- Description |
AG |
Australia Group
-
Chaired by Australia, the
"Australia Group" was formed in 1984 as a result of CW use in the Iran-Iraq War.
Its monitoring actions dealing with the exports of dual-use chemicals and biological
equipment complement measures in support of the 1925 Geneva protocol, the 1972
Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.
There are presently 30 members of the Group, including: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America, and the European Community
Commission (Observer). -
Export
Controls on Materials Used in the Manufacture of Chemical and Biological Weapons*
- Control List of Dual-Use Chemicals:
Commercial and Military Application e.g.
1) Thioglycol for plastics and CW mustard gas 2)
Arsenic trichloride for ceramics and CW Lewisite -
Control List of Dual-Use Chemicals Manufacturing Facilities and Equipment, and
Related Technology and
e.g. 1) Reaction Vessels, storage
tankers 2) Valves, Toxic
Gas Monitoring Systems and Detectors -
Control List of Dual-Use Biological Equipment for Export Control e.g.
1) Fermentors (100L capacity and above) 2)
Centrifugal Separators -
Control Core List of Biological Agents ** comprised of 1)
Viruses (20), rickettsiae (4), bacteria (13) 2)
GMOs containing nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity or coding
for toxins*** in the core list of micro-organisms
- Warning List**** comprised of 1)
Viruses (8), bacteria** (4), GMOs and toxins*** -
List of Animal Pathogens for Export Control** comprised of
1) Viruses (15), and Mycoplasma
mycoides, GMOs and Fungi (6) -
List of Biological Agents for Inclusion in Awareness Raising Guidelines
1) Bacteria (2), Fungi (2), Virus
(1), and GMOs. |
APIC |
Association for Professionals
in Infection Control and Epidemiology
Multidisciplinary and international in concept and
operation, APIC focuses on advancing, world-wide, healthcare epidemiology and
preventing illness and spread of infection
In partnership with the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has devised
an APIC/CDC Bioterrorism Readiness Plan: A Template for Healthcare Facilities.
The plan focuses on responses to bioterrorism built around the use of anthrax,
botulism toxin, plague and smallpox, post-exposure community management, precise
prophylactic decontamination measures specific for the type of each biological
threats in use, and development of appropriate healthcare control and bio-defence
measures to counteract and neutralise future bio-based terroristic attacks that
could lead to the onset of epidemics. Diagnostic laboratory facilities and implementation
of surveillance and control measures, on a conventional war scale are limited.
In fact, preliminary planning in devising effective measures have revealed that
stockpiles of vaccines antibiotics as effective bio-defence shields to restrict
mass casualties, and contain potential epidemics are either inadequate or non-existent
e.g. as witnessed in the tragedies in former Zaire, Rwanda and Kosovo. |
ASA |
Applied Science and Analysis,
Inc. -
·
Established in 1983, this US-based international organisation, 1)
specialises in nuclear, biological and chemical defence world-wide, and provides
expertise in: - chemical and/or biological
warfare defence - environmental management
and protection - public health preparedness
and risk assessment - monitoring of
nature, behaviour, mobility and fate of undesirable biological and chemical agents 2)
Disseminates knowledge and information on topics such as: -
Biological Warfare and Vaccines, and the Use of Toxic Chemicals as warfare agents -
Detection and decontamination protocols for chemical and biological agents and
toxins - Chemical and biological medicinal
treatment and emergency responses to agrochemical and industrial accidents and
disasters. |
ATSDR |
Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry -
The Agency with support of the US Department of Health and Human Services provides
technical assistance on: - Methodologies
and protocols in mitigating and preventing exposure to hazardous substances into
the environment - developing responses
to counter chemical-based terrorism using chemicals as skin-irritant, and choking
agents - decontamination and neutralisation
of oil-improvised incendiaries detrimental to agriculture and the environment -
hazards and risks posed by the transportation of toxic chemical residues, and
infectious clinical and domestic wastes. |
Bradford-SIPRI
project | The
joint University of Bradford-Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) Chemical and Biological Warfare Project -
Project aims through pooling of their Internet resources in providing a better
dissemination of information on the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1972
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and allied chemical and biological warfare
issues. On-line resources involve use of the Bradford and SIPRI databases concerning
bioweapons and chemical weapons proliferation, containment and disarmament. Engaged
in: - Reporting of outbreaks of Diseases
as part of Confidence- Building Measures in accordance with the WHO International
Health Regulations (IHR - see also under FAS) and the Pan American Sanitary Code
administered by the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO). The notifiable diseases
are: a) acute epidemic
poliomyelitis b) cholera c)
epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis d) epidemic
lethargic encephalitis e) influenza or
epidemic la grippe f) plague g)
smallpox h) typhoid and paratyphoid fevers
i) typhus j)
yellow fever - Reporting
of outbreaks of Annual Diseases to the Office International des Epizooties (OIE)
in accordance with the International Annual Health Code (IAH), and the International
Aquatic Annual Health Code (IAAH). Notifiable diseases are: a)
16 different terrestrial animal and bird diseases under the Animal Code:
- African horse sickness -
African swine fever - Contagious bovine
pleuropneumonia - Foot and mouth disease
- Highly contagious avian influenza -
Hog cholera (classical swine fever) -
Lumpy skin disease - Newcastle disease
- Peste des petits ruminants -
Rift Valley fever - Rinderpest -
Sheep pox and goat pox - Swine vesicular
disease - Vesicular stomatitis, and
b)
10 aquatic animal diseases under the Aquatic Animal Code:
-Bonamiosis -
Epizootic haematopoietic necrosis - Haplosporidiosis
- Infectious haematopoietic necrosis -
Marteiliosis - Mikrocystosis -
Oncorhynchus masou virus disease (synonym: salmonid herpesvirus type 2 disease)
- Perkinsosis -
Spring viraemia of carp, and - Viral haemorrhagic
septicaemia (synonym: egtved disease) -
Surveillance of plant disease outbreaks in accordance with the non-mandatory International
Plant Protection Convention. |
CBACI |
Chemical and Biological Arms Control
Institute -
Activities
focus on projects and programmes dealing with: -
Non-proliferation and the elimination of biological and chemical weapons -
international co-operation in controlling Chemical and Biological Terrorism -
containing the development of biological weapons arising from the misuse of technology
resulting from - globalisation of a
co-ordinated policy of unilateral technology denial -
developing a multilateral technology management strategic system that blends in
confidence -building measures the concerns
for technology protection with the benefits of technology sharing -
responding to the challenge of conserving health as a defence rampant in the maintenance
of global security by focusing on global trends: a)
emerging and re-emerging diseases, overburdened and outdated health infrastructures,
and new epidemics b) increasing resort
to biological aspects for use in biological warfare and bioterrorism c)
impact of disease on population dynamics, regional and international markets,
and by consequence on economic and political stability. |
CBIAC |
Chemical and Biological Defence
Information Analysis Centre -
Serving
as a focal point for the US Department of Defence Chemical and Biological Defence
Information Services, CBIAC provides, on a limited basis, publicly accessible
information, through its web-site and the CBIAC Newsletter technical information
and updates on: - The Progress and Prospects
in an overview of the Biological Weapons Convention -
Next Generation Technologies to counter proliferation e.g.:
a) Miniaturised portable mass spectro meter for
field detection of chemical and biological substances -
The Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS) Bunker which provides for training
in detecting, through air sampling and identification protocols, the presence
of biological agents in war condition -
Developing, testing and evaluating a)
Prepared readiness, and b) Emergency
response to threats of biological warfare, and bioterrorism -
Developing, testing, evaluating and maintaining: a)
High-quality easily accessible equipment and accessories for use in prepared readiness
and emergency response operations b)
Developing computer-based instruction manuals and exportable training kits for
use on-site field operations. |
CBMTS |
Chemical and Biological Medical
Treatment Symposium-Industry -
Series
of specialised symposia organised by Applied Science and Analysis, USA, since
1994 with focus on medical treatment for poisoning from chemical and biological
agents, agrochemical, pesticides, and industrials chemicals. CBMTS meetings deal
with: - the scientific and technical emerging
responses required from the chemical, biological, pharmaceutical and petrochemical
industries in times of war, terrorist acts, sabotage and accidents -
epidemiological surveillance an emergency management methodologies when encountering
biological warfare and bioterrorism -
eco-terrorism - incoming threats of
bioweapons and possible medical responses in countries in transition -
assessment of health impacts of war, bioterrorism, accidents, and outbreak of
infectious diseases. |
CNS |
Centre for Non-proliferation
Studies -
CNS,
the world's largest non-governmental organisation combating the spread of weapons
of mass destruction, is based in the Monterey Institute of International Studies,
California, USA, with offices in Washington D.C., and Almaty, Kazakhstan
It is engaged in a variety of
subjects such as: - Strengthening the
Biological Weapons Convention: Lessons from the UNSCOM experience***** -
International Organisations and Non-proliferation project (IONP) Initiated in
1992, IONP emphasises: a)
the training of the next generation of policy experts in the field of non-proliferation
and its varied aspects concerning ecological and chemical warfare b)
the development of practical options for the updating and reinforcement of review
and monitoring processes, c) reinforcement
of the capacity of international non-proliferation organisations in curbing and
eliminating the proliferation of weapons of mass d)
destruction, and inclusive of biological and chemical ones e)
their valuable mediating role in promoting substantive and sustainable dialogue
between governmental parties, and non-governmental sectors on the benefits of
non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons and arms control Projects
such as: - Chemical
and Biological Weapons Non-proliferation Project (CBWNP) founded in 1996, monitors,
in collaboration with the Centre for Global Research of the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBW),
developing strategies and confidence-building measures to create disincentives
for production and distribution of such weapons. The project has focused through
workshops on: a)
Sampling and analysis b)
Inspection procedures, and c)
Investigations of suspicious outbreaks of disease, and
specialised reports such as: a)
The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21st Century b)
Industry's Role, Concerns and Interests in the Negotiation of a BWC Compliance
Protocol c) Man Versus
Microbe: The Negotiations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. |
ECE |
Economic Commission for Europe
Safety guidelines in biotechnology,
issued in 1995 within the framework of ECE activities that originate from the
1986 Vienna Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference
on Security and Co-operation (CSCE) in Europe, focus on the exchange of information
on laws and regulations relating to the safety aspects of genetic engineering.
Contributions are from 30 countries in Europe and North America. |
EFB |
European Federation of Biotechnology |
EU |
European Union
-
Designed in the mid-1980s,
the EU regulatory framework covers: -
contained use of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) -
deliberate release of GMOs - protection
of workers to risks and biological agents during work -
product legislation (medicinal, and plant protection products, novel foods, feed
additives, seeds, etc.) - Intellectual
property protection - The Eurosurveillance
bulletin communicable diseases deals with surveillance networks supported by the
European Union, and co-ordinated by the European Centre for the Epidemiological
Surveillance of SIDA, St Maurice, France, and the Communicable Disease Surveillance
Centre, London, U.K. - Disseminates
printed and electronic data emphasising the different national approaches to prevention
of communicable diseases, results of outbreak investigations, and measures to
minimise further outbreaks and occurrences. -
reports on the European Union's efforts to: (a)
increase the exchange of information in public healthcare and epidemiology (b)
promote the development of national networks for surveillance of communicable
diseases in Europe |
EXTONET |
Extension Toxicology Network
A co-operative effort of the
Universities of California-Davis, Oregon State, Michigan State, Cornell and Idaho,
Exotonet issues toxicology information briefs and information profiles concerning
bioaccumulation; carcigenicity; cutaneous toxicity; toxicological dose-response
relationships; entry and fate of chemicals in humans and the environment and risk
assessment. |
FAO |
Food and Agricultural Organisation
- Administers Code
of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides -
Drafts Code of Conduct for plant biotechnology as it affects the conservation
and utilisation of genetic resources
Emerging Prevention System
for Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases, (EMPRES)
- Established in 1993, as a FAO
Priority Programme, EMPRES is designed to prevent, control, and eliminate animal
and plant diseases that: (a)
easily spread across national borders and boundaries (b)
jeopardize food security and endanger national economies and international trade
in livestock and animal products (c)
necessitate use of early warning systems to control emerging or evolving diseases
- Regional
Monitoring System for plant and animal pests on a priority basis Priorities in
monitoring are: contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, foot and mouth disease (FMD),
Newcastle disease, rinderpest, and rift valley fever. No plant diseases are encountered
as priorities.
Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS)
- Provides assessment of threats
to the current food situation, world-wide; highlights major food emergencies,
threats to food security by plant pests, and livestock diseases.
Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS) -
Designed to combat food insecurity as a weapon in destabilising the economies
of law-income food deficit countries. |
FAS |
Federation of American Scientists
Originally founded in 1945
as the Federation of Atomic Scientists by members of the Manhattan Project who
produced the first atomic bomb, the FAS focuses on the use of science, technology
and policy for global security through: -
Conduction, since 1989 of a Biological and Toxins Weapons (BTW) verification programme
which focuses on: a)
development of confidence-building political and technical measures for purposes
of verification b)
arrangement of all signatures to article, in spirit and action, by the terms of
the BTW Convention c)
development of a legally building protocol that prevents further proliferation
of biotechnological applications for use by military in war d)
development of network of early warning sites for monitoring emergency infectious
diseases in co-operation with WHO e)
emphasises the important contribution of WHO's Revised International Health regulations
(IHR) to the compliance and verification regime, also referred to as VEREX, of
the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (PROMED) involving world-wide
e-mail consultations, is reflected in consultative conference between experts
in human, animal and plant health. Since 1994, over 15,000 experts in some 150
countries participate in PROMED conferencing by e-mail on a daily basis the identity
of the following users:
- World Health Organisation (WHO) -
UN Agencies engaged in humanitarian and relief work -
Laboratory Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Atlanta, USA -
Public Health Laboratory Service, UK -
Pasteur Institutes in France (inclusive of that in Tahiti) and Vietnam -
National Institute of Health, Japan amongst several other prestigious bodies |
Henry
L. Stimson Centre | The
Henry Stimson Centre Named
after Henry L. Stimson, a distinguished individual in defence and foreign policy
in service to 3 American Presidents - Taft, Hoover, and F.D. Roosvelt, the Centre
a non-profit independent public institute which: -
is engaged in meeting challenges to global and regional security and stability
posed by economic, environmental and demographic influences -
in developing problem-solving initiatives that help minimise tensions arising
from insecurity fuelled by the development and proliferation of chemical and biological
weapons, and - in inducting
research analysis, education and disseminating knowledge through the following
projects on: a)
Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-proliferation b)
New Tools Peacekeeping c)
Training for Peacekeeping d)
The United Nations and Peacekeeping. -
Report 24: Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of
Action, January 1998 of relevance with following chapter content:
a) The Threat of Deliberate
Disease in the 21st Century (Pearson, G)******
b) Industry's Role,
Concerns, and Interests in the Negotiation of a BWC Compliance Protocol (Woollett,
G.) c) Doubts about
Confidence: The Potential Limits of Confidence-Building Measures for Biological
Weapons Convention (Chevrier, M.) d)
Verification Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Their Relevance
to the Biological weapons Convention (Tucker, J.) e)
Man Versus Microbe: The Negotiations to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention
(Smithson, A.E.) |
HSP |
Harvard Sussex Programme (HSP)
on Chemical and Biological Warfare Armament and Arms Limitation |
ICAO |
|
ICGEB |
International Centre for Genetic
Engineering and Biotechnology
International Conference on the Peaceful Use of Biotechnology and the Convention
on Biological Weapons (BWC), July 1998, organised by the ICGEB and the Landau
Network - Centro Volta. Article 2 of the ICGEB, inter alia, provides for action
"to promote international co-operation in developing and applying peaceful uses
of genetic engineering and biotechnology, in particular for developing countries"
- ICGEB provides
a biosafety resource, which is a scientific bibliographic database on Biosafety
and Risk Assessment in Biotechnology. Topics of concerns focus on the environmental
release of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) and the risks for animal and
human health (e.g. allergies and toxicity); for the environment (e.g. unpredictable
gene expression); and, for agriculture e.g. alteration of nutritional values,
and loss of biodiversity. |
IFMBE |
International Federation for
Medical and Biological Engineering Established
in 1959 by a group of medical engineers, physicists, doctors meeting in UNESCO,
Paris, France, IFMBE, has also promoted activities in medical physics, and cellular
and chemical engineering in improving the quality of life and protecting the environment.
Emphasis is also given to development of healthcare technology as a component
of the emergency response to environmental disasters. |
IMO |
International Maritime Organisation
- Issuance of IMO guidelines for
preventing the introduction of unwanted aquatic organisms and pathogens from ship's
ballast water and sediment discharges -
Joint IMO/WHO research on ballast water as a medium in the spread of bacterial
and viral epidemic-disease organisms -
Species protocols and type of packaging for authorised transmission of biological
perishable materials |
IRRO |
International Resources on
the Release of Organisms into the Environment |
Johns
Hopkins Centre (CBS) | Johns
Hopkins Centre for Civilian Biodefence Studies |
MC |
Mendoza Commitment |
OPCW |
Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons Established
in 1998 to achieve the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention; to ensure
the implementation of its provisions, to provide a forum for verification of compliance
with the Convention's protocols and to engender consultation and co-operation
amongst the States party to the Convention e.g. training course in May, 1999 on
Medical Defence against Chemical Weapons, Tehran, Iran. Attention is also focused
on the promotion of free trade in chemicals, and on international co-operation
and exchange of scientific and technical information in the field of chemical
purposes for peaceful purposes. |
PHR |
Physicians for Human Rights
Since 1986, PHR, an organisation
of health professionals, scientists and private citizens has mobilised its medical
and forensic resources to: -
investigate and prevent violations of humanitarian law -
improve health and sanitary environments and facilities in detention centres and
prisons - provide medical
care during times of war involving the use of all types of arms and weapons -
investigate violations of international conventions in force prohibiting the misuse
of harmful substances and agents that erode human physical and psychological health
- investigate, research
and document the use of mustard gas in the Anfal campaign tear gas in Southeast
Asia, and poisonous agents elsewhere in regional conflicts. |
PhRMA |
Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America Committed
to the discovery, development and market production of breakthrough medicines
to conserve human and improve the quality of life, PhRMA has promoted scientific
and regulatory activities that focus on: -
Highlighting the dangers of proliferation of biological and chemical warfare agents
- Handling and Disposal
of Hazardous Materials and Toxic Wastes -
Surveillance of Emerging Infectious Diseases -
The Threats of Bioterrorism. |
PIR |
Centre for Policy Studies in
Russia Established
in 1994, PIR focuses on international security, aims control, and civil-military
issues. Research studies focus, amongst other subjects, on:
- Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
Terrorism - Educational
programme on Arms Control as Non-proliferation -
Sensitive Exports and Exports Control Measures -
Destruction of Chemical Weapons in Russia -
Analysis of implementation of the Chemical Weapons, and Biological weapons Conventions.
|
Pugwash |
Pugwash
The village of Pugwash, Nova
Scotia, Canada is associated in the all Pugwash activities since 1957 when it
hosted the first conference of 22 eminent scientists from Australia, Austria,
Canada, China, France, Japan, Poland, the U.K., the USA, and Russia (then USSR),
to focus attention on the threat to civilisation arising from the advent of thermonuclear
weapons
Plays an important role in providing an international forum in bringing together
policy analysts and advisers for in-depth discussions on: chemical and biological
weapons; crisis management in the Developing countries; promotion of sustainable
development, and conservation of the environment against the threats of nuclear
armoury and bioterrorist attacks
Workshop, in 1988, on Public Health Systems in Developing Countries, in Habana,
Cuba, focuses on the erosion of human resources as a result of the interactive
equation between poverty and prevalence of infectious diseases; and on threat
of emerging diseases e.g. anthrax and small pox that have been contained or eliminated,
but which could result from reintroduction as a consequence of the use of the
corresponding microbial agents in bacterial weapons. |
RADISCON |
The Regional Animal Disease
Surveillance and Control Network (RADISCON)
Designated for North Africa and the Middle East and the Middle East and the Arab
Peninsula is a joint FAO/IFAD activity concerning 29 countries as follows:
- Maghreb/Sahel Sub-region:
Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco Niger and Tunisia -
Middle East Sub-region: Egypt, Palestinian Authority, Israel, Jordan, Iran, Iraq,
Lebanon, Syria and Turkey -
Arab Gulf Sub-region: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab
Emirates -
Horn of Africa/Others Sub-region: Ethiopia, Sudan. Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea
and Yemen The
network, since June 1996, reinforces methodologies in veterinary investigation
laboratory diagnostic and information services, through regional co-operation,
and assistance to the Animal Disease surveillance Systems of the network member
countries. As a result of such activities, preparedness efforts and emergency
responses to potential bio-based disasters are continuously updated.
The value of FAO's different
surveillance systems is exemplified in the swift action undertaken, to contain
the outbreak of the debilitating FMD virus amongst beef cattle in Algeria, Morocco
and Tunisia, through the RADISCON information network, the FAO/OIE World FMD Reference
Laboratory, Pirbright, U.K., the EMPRES network (see above), and the Rome based
European Commission for the Control of FMD. |
RG |
RIO Group
Established in 1986, and with
the membership of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, the RIO Group: -
Established in 1986, and with the membership of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, the RIO Group:
- promotes the establishment
of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean
- monitors the acquisition
of dual-use technology and its transfers -
prohibits the introduction of chemical and biological weapons (of mass destruction)
that threaten regional security and co-operation as a result of an initiative
- the Cartagena Declaration launched by Peru in 1991, and adopted by Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela |
SIPRI |
Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) -
The main areas of SIPRI's research are: -
Implementation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention -
Developments concerning disarmament of biological weapons -
CBW terrorism - CBW demilitarisation
and regional concerns regarding armament and disarmament issues -
SIPRI conducts many research
and academic activities. Amongst these is the Chemical and Biological Warfare
(CBW) project which began 30 years ago in 1966, focuses on all developments regarding
chemical and biological weapons. These include establishing of efficient and verifiable
disarmament and use by terrorist and criminal groups. Other activities are:
- Development of an Internet-based educational
module on weapons proliferation - Acceleration
of biological weapons disarmament -
Monitoring of technology transfer concerning knowledge, equipment and materials
within the remit of the Biological and Toxins Weapons (BTWC) and the Chemical
Weapons Conventions (CWC) - Biological
and Chemical Weapons Disarmament in the Commonwealth of Independent States -
Conduction of SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare studies amongst which are:
a) The International Organisation for Chemical
Disarmament (IOCD), No. 8, 1987 b)
Verification of Dual-Use of Chemicals under the Chemical Weapons Convention: The
Case of Thiodigylcol, No. 13, 1991 c)
Control of Dual-Threat Agents: The Vaccines for Peace Programme, No. 15, 1994.
|
UNESCO |
United Nations Educational
Scientific and Cultural Organisation -
International Forum on Possible Consequences of the misuse of Biological Sciences,
December, 1997, Como, Italy in collaboration with ICGEB, and Landau Network -
Centro Volta - Supports programme on Toxic
waste management with special emphasis on biosystems at International Chemical
Studies (ICCS), Ljubljana, Slovenia, 1998 -
International School for Molecular Biology and Microbiology established at Hebrew
University of Jerusalem with motto Science for Peace, and in which framework
programme activities are carried out with UNESCO support (1994/1996) -
Through its Field Office in Venice, UNESCO supports and endorses Genoa Declaration
on Science and Society issued in 1995 by representatives of national and international
scientific academies emphasising the role of science in constructive dialogue
between different cultures, and as powerful antidote to intolerance, and to ideological
and racial barriers |
UNEP |
|
UNIDIR |
United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research -
Established in 1980 as an autonomous institute -
to carry out independent research on disarmament and allied issues concerning
international security - to provide
relevant data on problems pertaining to international security, the arms race
and disarmament in all areas, with special emphasis in the nuclear field, for
purposes of facilitating greater security for all states, and economic and social
development of all peoples - to promote
informed participation by all states in disarmament efforts e.g. "exchange
of information on all outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences
caused by toxins that seem to deviate from the normal pattern as regards type,
development, place, or time of occurrence. If possible, the information provided
would include, as soon as it is available, data on the type of disease, appropriate
area affected, and number of cases."
- to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological
activities through a conference of participants in projects and publications dealing
with a) Biological
Warfare and Disarmament: Problems, Perspectives, Possible Solutions b)
The Transfer of Sensitive Technologies and the Future of Control Regimes with
a focus on: - Identifying
Tomorrow's Key Technologies in Weapon Systems, and in Weapons Components -
The Transfer of Dual-Use Technologies: The Missing Link Between Security and
Development - Cooperative Technology
Transfer Controls: Forging New Approaches to Solve Old Problems |
UNIDO |
-
United Nations Industrial
Development Organisations - Pioneers
in 1987, the institution of ICGEB as UNIDO project -
Gives support, in 1991, to establishment of the UNIDO/WHO/FAO/UNEP Informal Working
Group on Biosafety - Issues, in 1992,
Voluntary Code of Conduct for the Release of Organisms into the Environment -
Creates in 1995, Biosafety Information Network and Advisory Service (BINAS)
and releases BINAS News in collaboration with ICGEB |
UNSCOM |
United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM)
The Commission with a membership of 21 Member States: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
China, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, UK, USA, and Venezuela, targets the elimination
and destruction of suspected stockpiles of anthrax spores, botulinum toxin and
aflatoxin that were employed for weaponization in aerial bombs and SCUD missile
warheads prior to the onset of the Gulf War. |
VERIFIN |
Finnish Institute for Verification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention -
Initiated in 1973 as a chemical Weapons project, and as independent institute
of the University of Helsinki, VERIFIN: -
functions as the Finnish Authority for the Chemical Weapons Convention -
helps in the development of analytic methods for the disarmament of chemical weapons
- promotes postgraduate research and
teaching concerning the disarmament and elimination of chemical weapons -
co-operation with OPCW and the UN in the monitoring of compliance with the Chemical
Weapons, and Biological Weapons Convention. |
WASSENAAR |
WASENNAAR Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
-
The Wassenaar Arrangement
of 33 countries and whose secretariat is based in Vienna, Austria came into force
in 1995 as the successor to the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Exports
(COCOM) which was established in 1950, and is comprised of the original 17
COCOM members: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK and USA, and
since 1995, with the addition of Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation,
the Slovak Republic, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine with the following
goals: - Transparency in the transfer of
dual-use goods and technologies - Minimization
of destabilising stockpiles of such goods -
Reinforcement of existing control regimes and conventions for weapons of mass
destruction, and elimination of threats to international and regional peace and
security resulting from unmonitored transfer of sensitive dual-use goods and technologies -
Prohibition of militarisation of sensitive dual-use goods and technologies |
WHO |
World Health Organisation |
* Measures endorsed by G-7 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers. Source:
Communique from the London Econommic Summit 1991, 16 July 1991.
** Except where the agent is in the form of vaccine
*** Excluding immunotoxins
**** This group of biological agents, recognised as ubiquitous are still worthy
of special caution since they have been part of BW programmes in the past. *****
Duncan, A. and Johnson, K.G. 1997. The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4: pgs
49-54. ******
Name in parenthesis indicates the author of Chapter
Bioweapons Bioweapons
are characterised by a dual-use dilemma. On a lower scale, a bioweapons production
facility is a virtual routine run-of the-mill microbiological laboratory. Research
with a microbial discovery in pathology and epidemiology, resulting in the development
of a vaccine to combat and control the outbreak of disease could be intentionally
used with the aid of genetic engineering techniques to produce vaccine-resistant
strains for terroristic or warfare purposes. The best known example, reported
by UNSCOM (Table 3), is the masquerading of an
anthrax-weapon production facility as a routine civil biotechnological laboratory
at Al Hakam. In summary the dual-use dilemma is inherent in the inability to distinctively
define between offence -and defence- oriented research and development work concerning
infectious diseases and toxins. Whilst progress in immunology, medicine, and the
conservation of human power resources are dependent on research on the very same
agents of infectious diseases, bans and non-proliferation treaties are associated
with the research and production of offensive bioweapons. Genetic
engineering and information are increasingly open to misuse in the development
and improvement of infective agents as bioweapons. Such misuse could be envisaged
in the development of antibiotic-resistant micro-organisms, and in the enhanced
invasiveness and pathogenicity of commensals. Resistance to new and potent antibiotics
constitutes a weak point in the bio-based arsenal designed to protect urban and
rural populations against lethal bioweapons. An attack with bioweapons using antibiotic-resistant
strains could initiate the occurrence and spread of communicable diseases, such
as anthrax and plague, on either an endemic or epidemic scale. The
evolution of chemical and biological weapons is broadly categorised into four
phases. World War I saw the introduction of the first phase, in which gaseous
chemicals like chlorine and phosgene were used in Ypres. The second phase ushered
in the era of the use of nerve agents e.g. tabun, a cholinesterase inhibitor,
and the beginnings of the anthrax and the plague bombs in World War II. The Vietnam
War in 1970 constituted the third phase which was characterised by the use of
lethal chemical agents e.g. Agent Orange, a mix of herbicides stimulating
hormonal function resulting in defoliation and crop destruction. This phase included
also the use of the new group of Novichok and mid-spectrum agents
that possess the characteristics of chemical and biological agents such as auxins,
bioregulators, and physiologically active compounds. Concern has been expressed
in regard to the handling and disposal of these mid-spectrum agents by
"chemobio " experts rather than by biologists (Henderson, 1999). The
fourth phase coincides with the era of the biotechnological revolution and the
use of genetic engineering. Gene-designed organisms can be used to produce a wide
variety of potential bioweapons such as: - organisms
functioning as microscopic factories producing a toxin, venom or bioregulator
- organisms with enhanced
aerosol and environmental stability
-
organisms resistant to antibiotics, routine vaccines, and therapeutics
-
organisms with altered immunologic profiles that do not match known identification
and diagnostic indices
-
organisms that escape detection by antibody-based sensor systems
Public
attention and concerns, in recent times, have been focused on the dangers of nuclear,
biological and chemical-based terrorist threats (Nye, Jr. and Woolsey,
1997). This concern is valid given the significant differences between the
speed at which an attack results in illness and in which a medical intervention
is made, the distribution of affected persons, the nature of the first response,
detection of the release site of the weapon used, decontamination of the environment,
and post-care of patients and victims. Pollution and alteration of natural environments
occurs with the passage of time, as a consequence of reliance on conventional
processes such as dumping of chemical munitions in the oceans; disposal of chemical
and biological weapons through open-pit burning; and in-depth burial in soil in
concrete containers or metallic coffins (Miller, 1999). Incineration,
seemingly the preferred method in the destruction and disposal of chemical weapons,
is in the near future likely to be replaced by micro-organisms. Laboratory-scale
experimentation has shown that blistering agents, such as mustard mixtures e.g.
lewisite and adamsite, and nerve agents e.g. tabun, sarin
and saman are susceptible to the enzymatic action of Pseudomonas diminuta,
Alteromonas haloplanktis, and Alcaligenes xylosoxidans. In disposing
of the chemical weapon stockpile of diverse blister and nerve agents, research
now focuses on several microbial processes that are environment-friendly and inexpensive
in preference to costly conventional chemical processes in inactivating dangerous
chemical agents, and degrading further their residues (Mulbry and
Rainina, 1998). Chemical
weapons are intended to kill, seriously injure or incapacitate living systems.
Choking agents such as phosgene cause death; blood agents such as cyanide-based
compounds are more lethal than choking agents; and nerve agents such as sarin
and tabun are still more lethal than blood agents. The
use of bioweapons is dependent upon several stages. These involve research, development
and demonstration programmes, large-scale production of the invasive agent, devising
and testing of efficiency of appropriate delivery systems, and maintenance of
lethal and pathogenic properties during delivery, storage and stockpiling. Projectile
weapons in the form of a minuscule pellet containing ricin, a plant-derived
toxin are ingenuously delivered through the spike of an umbrella. Well known examples
of the use of such a delivery system are the targeted deaths of foreign nationals
that occurred in London and Paris in the autumn of 1978. Small-pox
virus has long been used as a lethal weapon in biological warfare. The decimation
of the American Indian population in 1763 is attributed to the wide distribution
by the invading powers of blankets of smallpox patients as gifts (Harris
and Paxman, 1982). More recently, WHO after a 23-year campaign declared the
eradication of smallpox world-wide in 1980. A landmark date of June 1999, had
been set in 1996, for the destruction of the remaining stocks of smallpox virus
that were being maintained in Atlanta, Georgia, USA, and Koltsovo, Siberia, Russia.
Current issues, however, such as the emergence of immunosuppressed populations
resulting from xenotransplantation and cancer chemotherapy, loss of biodiversity,
and the re-emergence of old diseases have necessitated a re-evaluation of the
decision to destroy "a key protective resource".
Fundamental research and field tests continue to focus on determining the minimum
infective dose of the biological agent required to decimate targeted populations,
the time period involved to cause disease instantaneously or over a long period
of time, and the exploitation of the entry mechanisms such as inhalation, ingestion,
use of vectors, and the contamination of natural water supplies and food stocks. The
institution of food insecurity is a subtle form of economic and surrogate biological
warfare. Conflicts over shared water resources in some regions of the world are
commonplace. Human health, food security and the management of the environment
are continuously being threatened, regionally and globally, by dwindling reserves
of water (Serageldin, 1999). Within the framework of a real
world perspective of biotechnology and food security for the 21st century, soil
erosion, salinisation, overcultivation and waterlogging are other constituents
(Vasil, 1998). Deliberately contaminated food containing herbicide,
pesticide or heavy metal residues, and use of land for crops for production of
luxurious ornamental plants and cut flowers, is another constituent of food insecurity.
Again, new and emerging plant diseases affect food security and agricultural sustainability,
which in turn aggravate malnutrition and render human beings more susceptible
to re-emerging human diseases (DaSilva and Iaccarino, 1999).
The deliberate release of harmful and pathogenic organisms, that kill cash crops
and destroy the reserves of an enemy, constitutes an awesome weapon of biological
warfare and bioterrorism (Rogers et al, 1999). Anticrop
warfare, involving biological agents and herbicides, results in debilitating famines,
severe malnutrition, decimation of agriculture-based economies, and food insecurity.
Several instances using late blight of potatoes, anthrax, yellow and black wheat
rusts and insect infestations with the Colorado beetle, the rapeseed beetle, and
the corn beetle in World Wars I and II have been documented. Defoliants in the
Vietnam War have been widely used as agents of anticrop warfare. Cash crops that
have been targeted in anticrop warfare are sweet potatoes, soybeans, sugar beets,
cotton, wheat, and rice. The agents used to cause economic losses with the latter
two foreign-exchange earnings were Puccinia graminis tritici and Piricularia
oryzae respectively. Wheat smut, caused by the fungus Tilettia caries
or T. foetida has been used as a biowarfare weapon (Whitby
and Rogers, 1997). The use of such warfare focuses on the destruction of national
economies benefiting from export earnings of wheat - an important cereal cash
crop in the Gulf region. In addition, the personal health and safety of the harvesters
is also endangered by the flammable trimethylamine gas produced by the pathogen.
Species of the fungus Fusarium have been used as a source of the mycotoxin
warfare in Southeast and Central Asia. Foodborne
pathogens are estimated to be responsible for some 6.5 to 33 million cases on
human illnesses and up to 9000 deaths in the USA per annum (Buzby
et al, 1996). The costs of human illnesses attributed to foodborne causes
are between US$2.9 and 6.7 billion, and are attributed to six bacterial pathogens-Salmonella
typhosa, Campylobacter jejuni, Escherichia coli 0157H:H7, Listeria
monocytogenes, Staphylococcus aureus and Clostridium perfringens
found in animal products. Consequently, there is the dangerous risk that such
organisms could be used in biological warfare and bioterrorism given that Salmonella,
Campylobacter and Listeria have been encountered in outbreaks of
foodborne infections, and that cases of food poisoning have been caused by Clostridium,
Escherichia and Staphylococcus. Bacterial
and fungal diseases are significant factors in economic losses of vegetable and
fruit exports. Viral diseases, transmitted by the white fly Bemisia tabaci
are responsible for severe economic losses resulting from damage to melons, potatoes,
tomatoes and aubergines. The pest, first encountered in the mid-1970s in the English-speaking
Caribbean region has contributed to estimated losses of US$50 million p.a in the
Dominican Republic. Economic losses resulting from infestation of over 125 plant
species, inclusive of food crops, fruits, vegetables and ornamental plants have
been severe in St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Trinidad and Tobago, and the Windward Islands. In Grenada, crop losses in the
mid-1990s were estimated at UD$50 million following an attack by Maconnellicoccus
hirsutus, the Hibsicus Mealy Bug. (Kadlec, 1995)
has explained how "the existence of natural occurring or endemic agricultural
pests or diseases and outbreaks permits an adversary to use biological warfare
with plausible denial" and has drawn attention to several imaginative possibilities. The
interaction of biological warfare, genetic engineering and biodiversity is of
crucial significance to the industrialised and non-industrialised societies. Developing
countries that possess a rich biodiversity of cash crops have a better chance
of weathering anticrop warfare. On the other hand, the food security of the industrialised
societies, especially in the Northern Hemisphere, is imperilled by their reliance
on one or two varieties of their major food crops. The use of genetic engineering,
whilst enhancing crop yields and food security, could result in more effective
anticrop weapons using gene-modified pathogens that are herbicide-resistant, and
non-susceptible to antibiotics. Threats to human health exist with the biocontrol
and bioremediation agent Burkholderia cepacia during agricultural and aquacultural
use (Holmes et al, 1998). Attention has also been drawn to the
new and potential threats arising from the uncontrolled release of genetically
modified organisms (Av-Gay, 1999).
Another aspect of biological warfare involves the corruption of the youth of tomorrow
-the bastion of a nation's human power with cocaine, heroin and marijuana derived
from drug and narcotic plantations reared by conventional and/or genetically engineered
agriculture. On the other hand, the eradication of such drugs plant crops through
infection with plant pathogens could prove counterproductive in yielding more
knowledge and skills to wipe out food crops, and animal-based agriculture. Bioterrorism Popular
scenarios of bioterrorism, that may have some mythical origins and cinematic Hollywoodian
links, include the use of psychotic substances to contaminate food; the use of
toxins and poisons in political assassinations; raids with crude biological cloud
bombs; use of dried viral preparations in spray powders; and low-flying cruise
missiles adding destruction and havoc with genetically-engineered micro-organisms. Public
awareness of the growing threat of bioterrorism in the USA is gathering momentum
(Henderson, 1999). Development of national preparedness and
an emergency response focus in essence, on the co-ordination of on-site treatment
of the incapacitated and wounded, on-spot decontamination of the affected environment,
detection of the type and character of the biological agent, and its immediate
isolation and neutralisation. The rise of bioterrorism as a priority item on the
agendas of international concern and co-operation is now being reflected in the
establishment of verification procedures to guard against contravention of the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and in efforts in institutionalising
a desirable and much needed state of preparedness. In the USA, there has been
a boost in funding for such research and defensive measures (Marshall,
1999). International workshops and seminars focus on the peaceful use of biotechnology
and the Convention on Biological Weapons (Table
3). In addition several other measures are in force to monitor the development
and use of bioweapons (Pearson, 1998). Data generated by the
Human Genome Project helps in the use of genomic information -
to develop novel antibiotics and vaccines,
-
to enhance national and civil defence systems to contain and counteract the use
of biological agents in the manufacture of bioweapons,
-
to minimise and eliminate susceptibilities of different peoples, cultural and
ethnic groups to hitherto unfamiliar or unknown diseases such genomic research
could fuel the production of ethnic or peoples' specific weapons.
Curators
and conservationists of biological diversity, public health officials, and biosecurity
personnel, developing emergency preparedness provide convincing arguments to continue
to maintain live viral stocks for the preparation of new vaccines in guarding
against the re-emergence of small-pox as a result of either accidental release
or planned use in bioterrorism. The microbiological community, and especially
culture collections have an important role to play in educating the public to
contain unexpected and sudden outbreaks of diseases through minimising the easy
acquisition of microbial cultures for use in bioterrorist threats. To offset the
illegitimate use of microbial cultures, obtained through either fraudulent or
genuine means, the microbiological community naturally occupies a central role
in answering the challenges posed in the production of bioweapons Biological agents
may be obtained from culture collections providing microbial species for academic
and research purposes; supply depots of commercial biologics; field samples and
specimens; and application of genetic engineering protocols to enhance virulence
(Atlas, 1998). An example is the acquisition by a laboratory
technician, of the causative agent of bubonic plague through the routine mailing
system. In addition to expanding and safeguarding the planet's microbial genetic
heritage, certified microbiologists can contribute to the building up of the defences
of peace through the development of educational and public health training programmes,
and surveillance protocols in counteracting bioterrorism. A
recent survey of over 1400 research institutions, universities, medical colleges,
and health science centres in the USA focused on research activities, production
capabilities and containment facilities that may necessitate compliance declarations
with the protocols of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Weller
et al, 1999). However, in the absence of a systematised infrastructure, the
administrative, educational, economic and legal costs are burdensome and considerable.
Compliance declarations and regimes are of direct consequence with institutions
that are engaged in routine and genetically-engineered research with specialised
groups of microbial pathogens and toxins; that possess high-level containment
facilities and laboratories; that are engaged in the design and engineering of
high-production capacity bioreactors with fermentation volumes of 100-litres and
above; and that do contract research for government and industry with biological
agents that could serve as potential triggers of biological warfare and bioterrorism
(Weller et al, 1999). In
brief, the very skills and technologies that are used by industry to screen, process
and manufacture drugs and vaccines could be used to develop bioweapons. Given
the increasing risks to pertaining to the threats of bioterrorism and bioweapons,
and the dilemma of dual-use technologies, site-verification of existing facilities
and data assemblage and monitoring activities seem to be necessary. Nevertheless,
despite bio-industrial concerns based on potential risks pertaining to loss of
confidential biotechnological data and proprietary genetic holdings, compliance
with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is a must. The role of industry
in designing apt verification measures is a crucial element in the strengthening
of the convention (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1999).
Doing so, as a fundamental and primary step, provides recognition of the utility
of the convention, and at the same time strengthens its importance and authority
in the outright banning of the production, stockpiling and manufacture of undesirable
bioweapons (Monath and Gordon, 1998). The practice of such investigations
emphasises the growing need for the development of a verification protocol that
deters and discourages violation of the Convention (Butler, 1997). The
necessity of producing and stockpiling the small-pox vaccine has been emphasised
in testimony by the author of the Hot Zone and Cobra Event (Preston,
1998). These are entertainment scenarios about the outbreaks of the Ebola
virus in the nearby surroundings of Washington, D.C., and a bioterroristic event
in New York City respectively. The potential outbreak of an epidemic of the now
eradicated small-pox, in a population that has not been vaccinated since the registration
of the last known case in Somalia in 1977, is a human disaster waiting to happen
and which can be contained and avoided well ahead in time. Another
aspect of bioterrorism is to disrupt agriculture, to decimate livestock, to contaminate
the environment, and to seed food insecurity through intentional food poisoning
and food infection. Concerns, recently, have been expressed about the possible
outbreak of gastrointestinal anthrax in Badakhshan, Afghanistan (Scott
and Shea, 1999), and in the border areas neighbouring Tajikistan, following
first reports of symptoms which are also common to cholera, gastrointestinal anthrax,
plague, tularaemia and listerosis. Appropriate
control measures in combating bio- and chemical terrorism, and the production
of bioweapons would involve: -
Enactment of national laws that criminalize the production, stockpiling, transfer
and use of chemo- and bioweapons
- Enactment
of national laws that monitor the use of precursor chemicals that lend themselves
to the development of chemical and bio-weapons
-
Establishment of national and international databanks that monitor the traffic
of precursor chemicals, their use in industry outreach programmes, and their licensed
availability in national, regional and international markets
-
Establishment and use of confirmatory protocols in the destruction and dispersal
of outdated stockpiles, and chemical precursor components.
Incidents
of bioterrorism in the last two decades, fortunately were rare. In the USA, the
most publicised case is that of the deliberate contamination of salad bars in
1984, with Salmonella typhimurium, an intestinal pathogen. The bioterroristic
act, carried out by members of the Rajnaashee cult in Oregon, was aimed at securing
an electoral result by incapacitating voters lacking empathy with the cult's preferential
candidate (Torok and Tauxe, 1997). This outbreak of salmonellosis,
and that of shigellosis (Kolavic and Kimura, 1997) are documented
examples of bio-threats to public health. Reporting of such cases is often rare
since credence is generally attributed to the more common occurrence of food infection
or food intoxication rather than to the criminal, and intentional, contamination
of food supplies and catering facilities. In
another well publicised case, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect released
the nerve agent sarin in a Tokyo subway in 1995 following failure to obtain
the Ebola virus for weaponisation in 1992 from (then) Zaire, and inability thereafter
to release anthrax spores from a building, and botulinum toxin from a vehicle. Bioterroristic
risks are minimised through effective responses built around the development of
preventive and control measures to contain, control, minimise, and eradicate outbreaks
of travel-related vaccine preventable diseases. Tropical medical practitioners,
public health personnel, immunologists, microbiologists, and quarantine authorities
have an important role to play in safeguarding against potential bioterrorism
in the future through timely detection of hepatitis A and B, yellow
fever, Japanese encephalitis, rabies, typhoid, anthrax, plague and meningitis.
To counter possible bioterrorist attacks using stolen or illegally acquired stocks
of the dreaded small-pox virus, the WHO has postponed the agreed upon destruction
date of June 1999 to December, 2002. It is likely at that time, that yet another
postponement may occur. Control,
monitoring and reporting systems Reporting
of outbreaks of disease, often attributed to natural causes, should always be
taken seriously since such outbreaks often result from non-compliance with the
prohibitions embodied in international conventions in force. Potential nosocomial
transmission of biological warfare agents occurs through blood or body fluids
(e.g. haemorrhagic fever and hepatitis viruses); drainages and secretions (e.g.
anthrax, plague, smallpox); and respiratory droplets (e.g. influenza plague, smallpox).
The obligatory notification and reporting of outbreaks of diseases in humans,
animals and plants helps to contain and neutralise the threats of biological warfare
and bioterrorism. Such practice, in accordance with existing health codes and
complementary reporting systems (Table 3), helps
to develop a reservoir of preparedness capacity. The
development of a response strategy and technology in monitoring the control of
weapons is at the core of a state of preparedness in the USA (New
York Academy of Sciences, 1998). Current anti-bioterrorism measures involve
the devising of unconventional effective countermeasures to combat misuse of pathogens
encountered either naturally or in a genetically modified state. Such a strategic
response involves: -
the use of bacterial RNA-based signatures and corresponding structural templates
through which all pathogens can be potentially identified through appropriate
trial and error testing, and verification;
-
development of a data base of virtual pathogenic molecules responding to
the bacterial signature templates;
-
development, evaluation and use of effective antibacterial molecules that eliminate
pathogens but do not harm humans nor animals (Ecker and Griffey,
1998).
Guidelines
and recommendations have been formulated for use by public health administrators
and policy-makers, medical and para-clinical practitioners, and technology designers
and engineers in developing civilian preparedness for terrorist attack (Institute
of Medicine, 1999). Areas covered deal with rapid detection of biological
and chemical agents, pre-incident analysis of the targeted area, protective clothing,
and use of vaccines and pharmaceuticals in treatment and decontamination of mass
casualties. The
lack of basic hygienic procedures accompanying the use of domestic and public
health facilities in the discharge, and disposal of human wastes has contributed
to a large extent of the state of unpreparedness in responding to obnoxious biological
weapons. Furthermore, the indiscriminate use of chemotherapeutics, and the overuse
of antibiotics, has contributed to a complacent sense of invincibility in confronting
once easily eradicated causative agents of disease.(Henderson,1999)
in summarising important distinctions between chemical and biological terrorism
emphasised the need for an awareness and allocation of resources in devising appropriate
responses to threats of bio- and chemoterrorism. Crucial elements of appropriate
and timely responses are the renovation and modernisation of the public health
infrastructure, the necessary networking of the para-clinical and specialised
medical forces involving nurses, general health practitioners, epidemiologists,
quarantine specialists and experts in communicable diseases. In brief, an appropriate
optimal response constitutes a co-ordinated management of medical capability and
restorative efforts backed up by supporting extension services. Several
examples of scientific societies, and of national, regional and global initiatives
addressing the global threats of emerging infections and disease have been documented
(DaSilva and Iaccarino, 1999). The African biotechnological
community is aware of the need of safety considerations and risk assessment in
the development and use of bioengineering micro-organisms (Van der
Meer et al, 1993). Activities in Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, South
Africa, and the Southern African Development Community (Angola, Botswana and Zimbabwe)
constitute a revelation of regional academic capacity and competence in addressing
issues formulating guidelines, and programming initiatives concerning food security,
recombinant DNA biosafety guidelines, and environmental biosafety protocols. Destruction
and deterioration of the environment is usually preceded by the emergence and
spread of infectious diseases. In Southern Africa, beset by war-plagued conditions,
migration of tribal populations and overnight development of nomadic villages,
the loss of life and erosion of human resources results from the occurrence of
AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, meningitis and dysentery. Academic and affluent societies
are often stricken by outbreaks of hamburger disease. The causative agent
is a virulent commensal Escherichia coli. AIDS
in South Africa is likely to become a notifiable disease as a consequence of governmental
concern in containing the widespread occurrence of the disease (Cherry,
1999). The Department of Industrial Health in Singapore, in fostering a favourable
workplace environment, requires the reporting of an outbreak or occurrence of
anthrax listed amongst 31 notifiable industrial diseases. The rare outbreak of
encephalitis in Malaysia, more recently, reached alarming proportions of concern
with severe economic and health implications for other Southeast Asian countries
e.g. Laos and Vietnam, thus prompting the destruction of large numbers of the
porcine population suspected of harbouring the virus. The
role of chemical protective clothing in the performance of military personnel
in combat and surveillance situations has been reviewed (Krueger
and Banderet, 1997). The performance and output of military and auxiliary
personnel is severely affected following exposure to chemical weapons using nerve
agents and disabling chemicals. Interference with a loss of physiological functions
such as loss of muscle control, paralysis of body movements, loss of memory, dermal
discoloration, prolonged deterioration of vision, speech intelligibility, and
the like result in loss of psychological confidence, and professional competence. The
development of chemical protective clothing incorporating chemical and biochemical
protectants, such as hypochlorites, phenolics, soap waxes, and antidotes, helps
offset psychological stress and trauma, and combat anxiety. Anti-biowarfare and
anti-bioterrorism research has led to the development of rub-on polymer creams
and anti-germ warfare lotions that provide protection also against the influenza
virus (Dobson, 1999a,b). Chemical protection
in the form of rubberised hoods and tunics, gloves, boots, and gas masks helps
guard against tear gas agents, nerve agents and chemical irritants delivered either
by aerosols or liquid sprays. Recently, the incorporation of antibiotics in routine
textiles as anti-odour and anti-infection agents has been reported (Barthélémy,
1999). Weapons
of mass destruction, be they nuclear, chemical or biological in nature, constitute
a threat to national security, and to regional and international co-operation
(New York Academy of Sciences, 1998). Civilian and military
vulnerability to biological weapons can be overcome by resorting to the development
of biosensors, fast-reacting bio-detection agents, advanced medical diagnostics,
and effective vaccination and immunisation programmes. Bio-detection
has been spurred on through the development of biorobots (Treindl,
1999). Mechanised insects with computerised artificial systems mimic through
microchips or biochips certain biological processes such as neural networks that
gather and process neural impulses that influence behavioural sensitivities to
stress and dangerous responses to substances of biological and chemical origin.
These micro-gadgets can carry out in a single operation tasks such as DNA processing,
screening of blood samples, scans for the presence and identifications of disease
genes, and monitoring of genetic cell activity normally carried out by several
laboratory technicians. Furthermore,
the ability to incorporate such dual-use cyberinsects and biorobots in the potential
weaponnization of biological agents needs to be addressed and curbed. Biorobots
of the household pest-the cockroach, Blaberus discoidalis, the desert ant-
Cataglyphis, and the cricket- Gryllus bimaculatus are already the
subject of in situ research. The cricket robot is being developed, in the
USA, through academic research within the framework of the Defence Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) robotics program. The main raison d'être of robobiology
is the development of miniaturised models with biomechanised minds that
could be used also in space biology exploration. Moreover, like humans and other
living systems, their life span is not limited by the deleterious effects of toxic
chemicals and wastes. To
help the medical community save lives during and in the immediate aftermath of
bioterrorist attack, DARPA has sponsored projects that rapidly identify pathogens
for treatment either with a combination of antimicrobial substances or nannobombing
with potent biosurfactant emulsions (Alper, 1999).
The development
of advanced biological and medical technologies aim at saving the 30 to 50 per
cent of lives that are traditionally lost in frontline battlefield areas, and,
reducing drastically the 90 per cent combat deaths that occur in close combat
prior to medical intervention. Such technologies involve the development and use
of surgical robot hands, trauma care technology, and remote teledecontamination
of biologically polluted environments. Tissue-based
biosensors provide reliable alerts and assessments of human health risks in counteracting
bioterrorism and biowarfare. Comprised of multicellular assemblies, and wide-ranging
antibody templates, such sensors detect. and predict physiological consequences
arising from biological agents that have not been fingerprinted nor identified
at the molecular level. Alerts and assessments are made through the use of reporting
molecules that express themselves through the phenomena of luminescence, fluorescence,
etc. For example, the pigment bacteriorhodopsin obtained from the photosynthetic
Halobacterium salinarum is used as a sensor for optical computing, artificial
vision, and data storage. Defensive and deterrent technologies are being developed
to afford maximum protection to civilian and military personnel; and to reduce
to a minimum the fall-out damage resulting from bioweapons that use unconventional
pathogen countermeasures, controlled biological systems and biomimetics in the
defence against biowarfare and bioterrorism (Table 4 a,
b, c). DARPA's
Unconventional Pathogen Countermeasures program focuses on the development of
a powerful and effective deterrent force that limits, reduces and eliminates damage
and spread out resulting from use of bioweapons. Such countermeasures focus on:
- Impeding and eliminating the invasive
mechanisms of pathogens that facilitate their entry through inhalation, ingestion,
and skin tissue
- Devising
broad-spectrum medical protocols and treatments that are effective against a wide
range of pathogenic organisms and their deleterious products
-
Enhancement of external protection using polyvalent adhesion inhibitors in protective
clothing, biomimetic pathogen neutralising materials, and personal environmental
hygienic protection systems
A
novel challenge for the biotechnological industry is the development of effective
biological defence programmes based on novel fundamental research in biotechnology,
genetics and information technology. Biosensor technology is the driving force
in the development of biochips for the detection of -
pesticides, allergens, and micro-organisms;
-
gaseous pollutants e.g. ammonia, methane, hydrogen-sulphide, etc
-
heavy metals, phosphate and nitrates in potable water
-
biological and chemical pollutants in the dairy, food and beverage industries
using
the tenets of reliability, selectivity, range of detection, reproducibility of
results, and, standard indices of taxonomy, contamination and pollution. Biodefence
programs are now being developed around the unique sensorimotor properties of
biological entities. Bees, beetles, and other insects are being recruited as sentinel
species in collecting real-time information about the presence of toxins or similar
threats. Biosensors,
using fibre optic or electrochemical devices, have been developed for detecting
micro-organisms in clinical, food technology, and military applications (King
et al, 1999; Mulchandani et al, 1999). An immunosensor is
used for the detection of Candida albicans (Muramatsu et
al, 1986). Bacillus anthracis, and bacteria in culture are detected
by optical sensors (Swenson, 1992). In addition, several systems
have been developed in the USA to detect biological weapons. Generic and polyvalent
immunosensors have been devised to detect biological agents that cause metabolic
damage and whose antigenic structure has been specifically genetically altered
to avoid detection by antibody-based detection systems. Other biodetection systems
functioning as early warning/alert systems involve the detection of biological
particle densities by laser eyes and electronic noses with incorporated alarms.
Emphasis in such systems is less on the identity of the biological agent, and
more on the early warning aspect which constitutes an effective arm in counteracting
the threat of bioterrorism in daily and routine peace time environments (Schutz
et al, 1999). Such
electronic noses result from a combination of neural informational networks with
either chemical or biological sensor arrays and miniaturised spectral meters.
Compact, automated and portable, electronic noses offer inexpensive on-the-spot
real-time analysis of toxic fuel and gas mixtures, and identification of toxic
wastes, household gas, air quality, and body odours (Wu, 1999). The
goal of such programmes is to prevent unpleasant technological surprises arising
from misuse of biological agents, chemicals, ethical pharmaceuticals, and obnoxious
gases. The preparedness involves the intelligence monitoring of the capabilities,
intentions, and resource materials of potential opponents, and terrorists. In
testimony to the U.S. Senate Public Health and Safety Committee, it was emphasised
that: a)
the strategy of developing and producing dual purpose diagnostics, therapeutics,
and vaccines that protects public health and defends against biological weapons b)
the control and elimination of infectious diseases through improved surveillance,
early warning, communication and training networks, and c)
the availability of front line preparedness and response in responding to bioterrotism
and biological warfare (ASM, 1999) are integral constitutive
elements of a preparedness domestic capacity against bioterrorism (Preston,
1998). Concluding
remarks Biological
warfare can be used with impunity under the camouflage of natural outbreaks of
disease to decimate human populations, and to destroy livestock and crops of economic
significance. Attempts
to regulate the conduction of warfare and the development of weaponry using harmful
substances such as poisons and poisoned weapons are enshrined in conventions drawn
up with respect to the laws and customs on land (Table 1).
These early instruments of war -prevention measures, and eventual confidence-building
and peace-building measures, have evolved from normal practices and characteristic
usages established amongst, civilised peoples; from the basic laws of humanity;
the tenets of long established and widely accepted faiths, and the dictates of
public conscience. In
that context, the conventions outline steps and measures to safeguard buildings
and historic monuments dedicated to art, religion and science, and to clinics
and hospitals housing the sick and wounded, provided they are not engaged in combat.
Use of such personnel in experiments designed to enhance the lethality of weaponry
containing harmful substances such as poisons, disabling chemicals and ethical
pharmaceuticals is implicitly and strictly prohibited. In the history of the interactions
between science, culture and peace, the term Unit 731 is associated with
the demeaning of science and humanity, their values and ethics. The activities
carried out by Unit 731 in World War II were prohibited as far back as
1907 (Table 1). In
neutralising the effects of biological agents and rendering them ineffectual for
use as bioweapons, bioindustries are now concentrating on the development of a
wide range of biotherapeutics - antibiotics and vaccines (Stephanov
et al, 1996; Perrier, 1999; Russell, 1999;
Zoon, 1999) through development of biologically-based defence
science and technology programmes. Current bioweapons defence research is now
focusing on developing biosensors containing specific antibodies to detect respiratory
pathogens likely to be dispersed through sprays and air cooling systems. Also
contract research centres around the use of biotechnologies to remediate environmental
areas contaminated with heavy metals, herbicides, pesticides, radioactive materials,
and other toxic wastes. The
genetic screening of human diseases and drug discovery have been facilitated by
research advances in the field of bioinformatics (Lehrach et al,
1997). The automated and computerised study of shared information in the genomic
DNA of biological resources in tandem with digital processing and graphic computation
techniques, offers a base for the development of devices for monitoring environmental
degradation and development of biodefence programmes (Table 4 a,
b, c). The aim of such research
in developing sensors for the timely detection and neutralisation of biological
weapons is reflected in "Sherlock Holmes' dog that doesn't bark", i.e the silence
of the sensor indicates the presence of a biological agent (Morse,
1998). Table
4
(a). Example
of devices for use in developing biodefence programmes
Type |
Features |
Bacillus Microchip |
·
Detects Bacillus
anthracis, and identifies it from amongst other generic members such as B. thuringiensis, B. subtilis and.
B. cereus
| BIDS |
· Biological Integrated Detection System detects
through a laser-based sensor large areas under biological attack.
Also functions as a warning system. BIDS is also capable of speeding up
treatment of biowarfare casualties by narrowing down the range of identities of
specific biological agents used as bioweapons. Variations of the system allow for the detection of between to 4 and 8 biological warfare
agents in lees than an hour. The system is transportable for use by vehicle and
laboratory-designed aircraft
|
CRP |
·
Critical Reagent Program designed to provide a ready available resources of antibodies,
antigens, and gene probes for use in field detection and neutralisation of biological
warfare agents
|
IBAD |
·
Interim Biological Detector designed as a manual
hand-held assay for use on ships with links to aural and visual alarms, IBAD provides
advance warning of the presence of biological warfare agents through immunochromatographic
analysis
|
IOTA |
·
Voltametric instrument comprised of miniaturised
electrodes for optional use with antibodies, enzymes, organic dyes, and molecules
for detection of heavy metals in body fluids, micro-organisms, pesticide contaminants
in foods and potable water, etc accompanied by graphic computation
|
JBPDS |
·
Joint Biological Point Detection System is designed
for use in protecting ports, naval ships,
airfields, and as a portable warning system in conjunction with meteorological
data. Automatic detection and identification of up to 10 biological
warfare agents in less than 30hrs.is feasible. Enhanced versions of the
systems focus on providing rapid facilities
for the identification of 25 biological warfare agents thus speeding up choice
of treatment of casualties
| LRBSDS |
·
Long Range Biological Standoff Detection System
possesses a detection range of 50 kms, and through a laser eye distinguishes between
artificial and natural aerosol clouds. The system has also been designed
for complementary use with BIDS
| LIBRA
| ·
Comprised of quartz crystal resonators coated
with optional layers of antibodies, enzymes, etc for use in identification of
micro-organisms, pesticides, and other dangerous
organic molecules and chemical gases with computer prints
|
MAGIChip |
·
Micro-array of gel-immobilised compounds that
identify simultaneously numerous biological agents through reliance on microbe-specific
gene sequences, and microbe-specific sequences of ribosomal ribonucleic acids
(rRNAs)
|
PAB |
·
Biosensor system with potentiometric alternating
biosensing silicon chip, which Interacts with a biological element such as cells,
enzymes, etc with measured pH rates or redox potential variation. Used in determining
metabolic variations in bacterial cells in response to presence of pollutants,
drugs, hormones, pesticides, etc., with graphic computation
| Portal
Shield | ·
Used in the Southeast Asian region for the protection
of harbours and airfields, this biodefence system facilitates biological detection
and identification, decontamination of biosensor equipment and reduction of casualties
| Table
4 (b). Examples of biodefence programmes conducted by university, industry and
governmental agencies
Category | Characteristics |
Research by laboratories | Remarks |
Government |
Industry |
University |
Antibacterials |
|
1 |
3 |
3 | Research
conducted in Sweden and the USA |
Animal Systems |
Use of insect vectors as early
warning systems e.g. detection of chemical signals by parasitic wasps, exploitation
of arthropod interaction with biomolecular stimuli, and engineered bee-colonies
for detection of harmful of biowarfare agents |
1 |
2 |
3 | |
Antitoxins |
|
1 |
1 |
3 | Research
conducted in Israel and the USA | Antivirals |
Development of protein-based
protective agents; invasive intracellular antibiotics, identification of common
target inRNA viruses; disruption of cell transport with non-peptide antiviral
agents; and rapid drug responses to biological warfare and bioterrorism without
loss in potency and effectiveness during stockpiled storage | |
2 |
4 | |
Table
4 (c). Biodefence programmes R & D areas
Type | Features |
Casualty Care |
|
Tissue-based Biodefence |
-
Uses functional biosensors
providing assessments of dangers and risks to civilian and military personnel
through detection of biowarfare agents in low concentrations through industrial-research
projects such as: - vascularised tissue
sensors for detection of generic toxins and pathogens -
rapid sensitive detection system for biological agents of mass destruction |
Development
of national preparedness and emerging responses to biological agents, either in
bioterroristic or combat situations, is dependent upon the rapidity of intervention
by trained antiterroristic personnel comprised of microbiologists, doctors, hospital
staff, psychologists, military or law-enforcing forces, and public health personnel.
In this regard, the economic impact of a bioterroristic attack has recently been
assessed (Kaufmann et al, 1997). Investing in public health
surveillance helps enhance domestic preparedness in dealing with, bioterrorism,
emerging diseases and foodborne infections. The
likelihood of genetically engineered micro-organisms contributing to the emergence
of new infections cannot be ignored. Public reaction to the introduction of genetically
engineered crops into Europe, at this time, is accompanied by controversy and
fears for environmental safety. The uncertainty accompanying the potential outbreaks
of new scourges is another complicating factor. Increasing public awareness and
understanding of safety issues and the release of genetically engineered organisms
into the environment helps to overcome unsubstantiated fears and misconceptions,
and to secure confidence through a state of preparedness. On such strategies,
a ready and effective response exists to combat potential catastrophes and outbreaks
of emerging diseases. The science and value of environmental safety evaluations
constitute a right step in this direction (Käppeli and Auberson,
1997). New
threats from weapons of mass destruction continue to emerge as a result of the
availability of technology and capacity to produce, world-wide, such weapons for
use in terrorism and organised crime (Department of Defence, 1996).
Novel and accessible technologies give rise to proliferation of such weapons that
have implications for regional and global security and stability. In counteraction
of such threats, and in securing the defence of peace, the need for leadership
and example in devising preventive and protective responses has been emphasised
through the need for training of civilian and non-civilian personnel, and their
engagement in international co-operation. These responses emphasise the need for
the reduction and elimination of bioterrorism threats through consultation, monitoring
and verification procedures; and deterrence, through the constant availability
and maintenance of a conventional law and order force that is well-versed in counterproliferation
controls and preparedness protocols (American Society for Microbiology,
1999). Adherence
to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, reinforced by confidence-building
measures (United Nations, 1997) is indeed, an important and
necessary step in reducing and eliminating the threats of biological warfare and
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(Table1) : Chronological summary of conventions, protocols
and resolutions curbing biological warfare
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by UNESCO / MIRCEN
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1999 by Universidad Católica de Valparaíso -- Chile
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