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Health Policy and Development
Department of Health Sciences of Uganda Martyrs University
ISSN: 1728-6107 EISSN: 2073-0683
Vol. 6, Num. 1, 2008, pp. 83-91
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Health Policy and Development Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, April, 2008, pp. 83-91
Official Development Assistance: a Critical Overview
Maurizio Murru
E-mail: maurimurru@gmail.com
The author is a private consultant on Health Systems in Developing Countries based in
Modena, Italy and a Visiting Senior Lecturer, Uganda Martyrs University.
Code Number: hp08010
Abstract
Whereas 22 developed countries have pledged to contribute a paltry 0.7% of their GDP in form
of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries, after 40 years of the
commitment, only five countries have come close to that target. This paper argues that even then, the
assistance is provided inefficiently since most of it is spent as unsolicited expensive Technical Assistance
or repatriated in form of input purchase conditionalities. The paper also argues that ODA figures
are artificially inflated by donors including forgiven debts as new assistance. It traces the recent
history of development assistance from the Marshall Plan to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
It singles out aid conditionalities as "master-student arrogance". It also criticises endless
postponement of deadlines for achieving human development goals as tantamount to goal-shifting. Finally,
it concludes that external aid cannot deliver a country from poverty, since the amounts committed
are too small, the commitment too little, the donor agendas too many, and argues that only fair
trade can contribute meaningfully to lifting the poor in recipient countries to acceptable levels of
human development.
The beginning
Theoretically, the logic behind the so called
"Official Development Assistance" (ODA) lies in the
enormous and unjust inequalities between the standards of
life of rich and poor countries' populations.
Definitions and concepts of "development" have changed
for several decades. In 1990 the concept of
"human development" appeared in the first
"Human Development Report" published by United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In this
document we read that "[human development] denotes
both, the process of widening people's choices and the
level of their achieved wellbeing" (UNDP, 1990).
ODA from rich countries should, by definition,
contribute to the human development of poor
countries' populations.
Even during the colonial era, sporadic and
disjoined activities were carried out by individuals
and organizations "in favour" of colonized
countries' people. After World War II the British and
French governments earmarked funds for their
colonies "development" (whatever this meant at the
time). Between 1945 and 1955 the British Government spent about US$ 840 million and the French spent about
US $ 1,108 million (Biroli, 1994) for this purpose.
The birth of the United Nations, in 1945, boosted the
ideals of universalism and solidarity.
The first significant and structured example of
ODA is the so called "Marshall Plan" that, between
1948 and 1951, channelled from the United States to
16 European countries US$ 13.812 billion, about 2%
of the American Gross Domestic Product -GDP- of
the time (Mammarella, 1986).
In his US presidential inaugural speech on
January 20th 1949, Harry Truman said "
We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits
of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth
of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people
of the world are living in conditions approaching
misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of
disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant.
Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them
and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in
history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill
to relieve the suffering of this people" (Truman, 1949).
The speech contains some of the recurrent
themes, the illusions and the declared good intentions of
the "International Aid System" (which, by the way,
is not a "system" at all). We do not want to discuss
the different and complex aspects of the Marshall
Plan here. However, it is, for now, acknowledged that
it had humanitarian, strategic and economic
objectives. Today's ODA, too, has a wide range of
motivations: from the noblest aspirations to solidarity and
social justice to the meanest considerations of political
and commercial convenience, all this passing through
a thick grid made of honesty and hypocrisy, and of professionalism and amateurism.
What is meant by ODA?
According to the World Bank,
"Development assistance encompasses both financial and
non-financial instruments that are aimed at supporting
the recipient country's efforts to accelerate growth
and reduce poverty. [
] Resource transfer is an
important part of development assistance [
]. But finance
is only one of the instruments used to support development and, in some situations, it is not
even the most useful one. Development assistance
also includes analysis, advice and capacity
building" (World Bank, 2002). According to the most
commonly accepted definition, introduced by the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), an organ of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) responsible for following
up and improving aid effectiveness, any financial
transfers from rich to poor countries to be considered
"Official Development Assistance" must satisfy at least
three conditions:
- Come from the public sector
- Have as their main objective the promotion
of economic growth and social welfare
- Be released as "grants" or, if released as
loans, have a grant component of at least 25% of
their total amount (Dengbol-Martinussen et al. 2003)
The OECD was born in 1961, when it replaced
the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) founded in 1948 to manage the
Marshall Plan funds. Currently the OECD member states
are 30 (not all of them are, also, DAC members)
and others wait to join.
Financial flows
Data on ODA financial flows are
fragmented, incomplete and debatable. For instance, up to
1993, when this was forbidden by DAC, the USA
included, in their ODA, the forgiveness of debts incurred by poor countries to buy American weapons.
However, administrative costs of delivering aid are still
counted as part of the aid. The most accurate and
complete data are those on the funds released by the 22
DAC member countries. These data are released each
year with graphs, comments and clarifications.
As for the funds released by China, India, oil
rich Arab countries, etc. the available estimates
are inaccurate, even because these countries do not
seem very keen to release this sort of information.
In 1958 ODA amounted to US$ 3.2 billion.
This amount increased gradually in absolute terms, especially in the second half of the 70s and
between 1985 and 1992. From 1992 ODA funds
decreased gradually in absolute terms (Dengbol-Martinussen
et al. 2003). They started to grow again in 1998
reaching their peak in 2005, at US$ 106.5 billion. This
was 0.33% of DAC countries' GDP, up from 0.24% in 2004 (OECD, 2006). It is worth noting that the
2005 record amount in absolute terms, when calculated
as donor countries GDP, was the same as in 1992.
In 2006 the ODA flows from DAC countries decreased to US$ 103.9 billion, equal to 0.3% of their
combined GDP (OECD 2007). In absolute terms, in 2006,
the US was the biggest donor, with US$ 22.74
billion. However, by considering ODA as a percent of
GDP, the USA are next to last, with a mere 0.17%. In
1969 the United Nations Commission on
International Development, chaired by Lester Pearson,
proposed that rich countries earmark, every year, 0.7% of
their GDP to ODA. This objective was approved by
the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1970
and was accepted by DAC members with the exception of the USA and Switzerland. Currently, only five
of the 22 DAC countries respect this commitment: Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway
and Sweden (OECD, 2007).
The growth of ODA in the last few years (about
11% per year between 2001 and 2005) was mainly due debt forgiveness (about 70%); only 25% was due
to the release of new funds (IDA, 2007).
Numerous countries not belonging to the DAC
group channel increasing funds to ODA. According to
IDA (International Development Association, the
World Bank's branch responsible for giving soft loans
to countries with an annual GDP per person lower
than US $ 965) the ODA funds from countries
belonging to OECD but not to DAC are, currently, about US$
1 billion and could double by 2010 (World Bank,
2007). ODA funds from countries not belonging to
OECD, like Brazil, China, India, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, etc. were about US$ 5 billion in 2005, about
three times as much as in 2001 (World Bank 2007).
To these funds we must add those provided by
individual citizens, religious groups, non governmental
organizations (NGOs) and various Foundations (Bill
and Melinda Gates, Clinton, Rockefeller, Soros, etc.).
However, documenting financial flows coming from
private sources is extremely difficult. The World Bank
estimates that, in 2005, this amount was about US$
14.7 billion, more than twice the amount of 2001 (World
Bank, 2007).
Other financial flows towards poor countries
ODA represents only one of the financial flows towards
poor countries. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is
significant for many countries and has been growing
for the last few years. It is very selective and its
effectiveness in promoting equitable development is
debatable. In 2006, out of a total of about US$ 800
billion, FDI in Africa was only about US$ 38 billion
and was mostly directed towards countries rich in oil
and other natural resources (UNCTAD 2007).
Perhaps more significant in promoting development
and fighting poverty are the remittances from migrants.
They were estimated at about US$ 31 billion in 1990
and about US$ 150 billion in 2005 (ILO 2006). These
are only estimates. Significant amounts of money are
moved through informal channels and they can only
be “guesstimated”. The World Bank estimates that the
amount not captured by official statistics could be
equal to (or, even, higher than) 50% of the official
one. This would bring remittances to a total of more
than US$ 250 billion (World Bank, 2006a). This
amount is more than twice that of ODA, its transaction
costs are much smaller and it reaches the beneficiaries
without intermediaries.
Aid distribution
Countries receiving DAC funds are divided in four
categories (DAC 2007):
- Least Developed countries
- Other low income countries (Gross National
Income per person and per year less than US$
825 in 2004)
- Lower middle income countries and territories
(Gross National Income per person and per year
between US$ 826 and US$ 3,255 in 2004)
- Upper middle income countries (Gross National
Income per person and per year between US$
3,256 and US$ 10,065 in 2004)
The first category (Least Developed Countries) is used
by the United Nations since 1971. It is not only based on income criteria and it includes countries
judged "
structurally disadvantaged in their
development process and, more than other countries, at risk
of failing in their effort to escape poverty"
(UNCTAD, 2005). This group currently includes 50
countries, 34 of them in Africa. The percentage of
ODA channelled to the first two categories has been
around 60% from the 70s onwards and achieved 67%
between 2001 and 2005 (IDA, 2007). Between 2001 and
2005 Sub-Saharan Africa received about 38% of DAC countries' ODA (in the 60s it was about 20% and
in the 70s about 22%); Southern and Central Asia received about 15%; Middle East and North
Africa 14% and East Asia 11% (IDA, 2007).
The distribution of aid funds is not homogeneous
and does not always reflect equity criteria. Political
and commercial interests play an important role.
Political considerations, which were of paramount
importance during the Cold War, still are. Even if the total
amount of ODA increased by about 55% between 2001
and 2005, only 18 of IDA eligible countries have seen
their aid growing by 50% or more. Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nigeria,
the Republic of Congo, Sudan, have seen the most significant increases (World Bank, 2007).
Aid to Fragile States
The euphemistic term "fragile states" refers to
those countries not able (or not willing) to deliver to
their citizens basic rights such as security,
education, health, and development opportunities in
general. They often are states plagued by protracted
armed conflicts or social crisis, ruled by corrupt,
despotic and inefficient governments. In 2005 the World
Bank identified 25 low income countries that,
analyzed according to the criteria of the so called
CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment)
could be defined as "fragile states". About 500
million people live in these countries. Their infant
mortality rates are one third higher than those of other
low income countries, their maternal mortality rates
20% higher and their life expectancy at birth 12
years shorter (World Bank, 2006b).
During the last few years, based on facts and
common sense, the idea that aid works better in countries
ruled by governments functioning reasonably well and
that, therefore, it should be given selectively has gained ground. It seems obvious that aid given to a
country well administered and in peace, like Costa Rica,
is likely to achieve better results than aid given to
a country led by a failed government like Zimbabwe
or to a country virtually without a government
like Somalia. There is, however, an increasing, although hesitant, agreement that it is wrong to ignore
the "fragile states". On one side it is deemed iniquitous
to forget about 500 million people living in
abysmally poor conditions. On the other hand, it seems right
to engage with fragile states and try to contribute to
their normalization even because of the negative
effects that they have on neighbouring countries. It seems
a matter of political farsightedness. According to a
study published in October 2007 by IANSA, OXFAM International and Saferworld, only in the
African Continent do conflicts cost about US$ 18 billion
per year (plus other costs defined as
"intangible"). Furthermore, an armed conflict in one country
reduces the GDP in neighbouring countries by about
0.9% per year (IANSA et al, 2007). The logic of
engaging with these countries, therefore, with all the
difficulties involved, seems to be based not only on
humanitarian considerations but, also, on considerations
of international security.
The effectiveness of this aid is
disappointing. Sometimes it seems possible to achieve
something marginally useful at local level such as a
functioning health unit, food that is distributed,
small communities that, in some way, remain in
contact with the external world than attempting to
support the entire fragile country. In 2005 the "fragile
states" received about US$ 20 billion in aid. Excluding
debt forgiveness and emergency aid, this amount
comes down to US$ 10 billion (World Bank, 2007). In
a 2002 article Easterly has stigmatized the decision
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank of granting further debt forgiveness to
Burkina Faso as follows "
It would be interesting to
know more about how much the poor were newly
empowered in a one-party state that has been in power
since 1987, which was in the worst fifth of the world
in corruption in 2001, and which supported rebel warlords that perpetrated tragic atrocities in
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola" (Easterly, 2002).
This is a complex issue with no simple solution.
There are only weak illusions, weak hopes and
sometimes embarrassing compromises.
How aid is disbursed
Aid can be disbursed in several ways: directly
from the government of a donor to the government of
a recipient country (bilateral aid), through
international organizations like the various United Nations
Agencies and Funds, the European Union, Regional
Development Banks and Regional Development
Organizations (multilateral aid) or (increasingly) through
Non-government organisations (NGOs). In theory, multilateral aid should be less linked to the
specific interests of the donor countries.
In 2006 about 70% of DAC countries' ODA
was disbursed as bilateral aid and the remaining
30% through multilateral channels; about 90% of
multilateral aid was disbursed as grants (IDA, 2007).
Aid can fund specific projects or can contribute
to the state budget of the recipient country or to
the budget of specific sectors (health, education, transport, etc.). General Budget Support should
allow for a more flexible and efficient use of aid
funds. Disbursement for general budget support takes
place on the basis of policies and plans jointly agreed
by donors and recipients; monitoring and evaluation
are carried out together and accounting is done using
a single system, usually the one of the recipient
country. At least theoretically, this way of disbursing aid
funds should ease the achievement of objectives like
donor coordination, alignment of donor and
recipient objectives, lower transaction costs,
greater transparency and accountability.
In practice, as always, things are slightly
more complex. Donors, acting not in a disjoined way,
with specific projects, but acting together to discuss
policies and plans, can constitute a formidable cartel,
much stronger and much more capable of exerting
influence and pressure. Moreover, many donor countries
keep various options open: they put some of their funds
in budget support and use other funds for specific projects.
Arguably, the overwhelming influence of a "cartel
of donors" could be counteracted by recipient
countries' governments if represented by a critical mass
of officers with competence, commitment and
integrity (as it happened in the Uganda health sector
between the end of the `90s and the beginning of the
new century). A transparent budget support is likely to
be easier when recipient countries' governments
are trusted for their competence, transparency and honesty.
A study on budget support efficiency
and effectiveness, commissioned by 19 bilateral cooperation agencies, five international agencies
and seven recipient countries governments, published
in 2006, reached fundamentally positive conclusions
on this way of disbursing funds (Birmingham
University, 2006). More and more donors are choosing
budget support. In 2001 aid funds directed towards
budget support were 8% of the total DAC countries'
ODA funds. In 2004 this amount was 20% (IDA, 2007).
According to recent estimates, aid funds directed
to social sectors like education, health and water supply, increased from 29% in the 90s to 52% between
2000 and 2004, and from 33% to 60%, respectively, in
Sub-Saharan Africa (IDA, 2007). The increase of
funds directed to social sectors coincided with an
increased tendency of many donors to link their funds to
specific sectors (a sort of conditionality).
Proliferation and fragmentation of the aid system
In this context, "proliferation" means the increase
in the number of donors, while "fragmentation"
refers to the number of activities funded by a single
donor. In the last few years the number of donors
increased enormously. This not only makes the whole
scene more complex, but makes it much more difficult
to coordinate effectively the use of aid funds. In the
40s, bilateral donors were less than a dozen. Today
they are more than 50. Even the number of
International Organizations, specific Funds and Programs
increased rapidly: it is estimated that they are more than 230
but an updated and accurate census is impossible.
The average number of donors present in a single
recipient country increased from about a dozen in the 60s
to more than 30 in the period between 2001 and
2005. Since the end of the Cold War the number of
recipient countries with more than 40 donors,
including governments, international organizations,
vertical funds, foundations, etc., increased from 0 to 40.
The health sector is the most affected by
proliferation, with about 100 major organizations active in it
(IDA, 2007).
The fragmentation of activities funded by a
single donor is the other face of this problem. Things
are made worse by the fact that many of these
activities, often of short duration, are "Technical
Assistance" (TA), expensive and, often, irrelevant. In 2004
alone, TA missions funded by various donors, often
linked to small disbursements of short duration, were
more than 20,000: more than one per day in each and
every one of the recipient countries (IDA, 2007). It is
easy to understand the problems posed by this situation
to the administration of structurally weak countries.
This high number of actors, with their priorities,
their monitoring and accounting systems, their
fragmented activities and often non-requested TA missions,
lead to a high level of bureaucratization,
confusion, duplications and waste. It increases the costs
and decreases the effectiveness of aid. To all this,
one must add the volatility of aid: most donors, of
whatever type and nature, commit themselves only for
short periods of one or two years.
The example of Tanzania gives a reasonably good
idea of the crazy situation of many recipient countries.
In 2005 the great part of aid funds received by this country financed more than 700 projects,
managed by about 60 parallel "implementation units". Half
of the aid reaching the country funds activities
not coordinated with the ones of the government. Still
in 2005, the country received 541 missions sent by various donors and only 17% of them involved
more than one donor (DAC, 2006).
Conditions always imposed on
recipient countries...
For the last 60 years or so, in rich countries, a
flurry of theories have followed one another on
development, its meaning, its objectives and the best policies
to achieve it. Such policies must then be adopted by
poor countries as a "condition" to receive aid. The idea
of "conditionality" is often (and rightly) associated
to the modus operandi of the IMF and the World
Bank. However, in a way or another, more or less
strongly, all donors have conditions to impose. For many
years the bulk of these conditions concerned,
mainly, economic policies. In this regard, structural
adjustment programmes are a sort of paradigm.
Neo-liberal economic policies, such as devaluation of the
national currency, downsizing of the public sector, cuts
to spending in social sectors including education
and health, have been imposed on poor countries with
a "blanket approach", without taking into account
the different contexts. Little or no attention has been
paid to the social consequences of this approach.
The policies imposed on recipient countries,
stemming from the different theories on development,
were always thought to be right and immune to
criticism. We have seen the state supported as the main actor
in promoting development, especially of
infrastructure, in the 50s and 60s of last century; then we have
seen the "basic needs" approach in the 70s; then
the structural adjustment programmes in the 80s and
90s with the role of the state cut down in favour of
the market; then, the emphasis on democracy and
good governance, the fight against poverty and
against gender disparities from the second half of the 90s
up to this day.
The main problem with conditionality does not
even lie in the nature of the conditions themselves but
in the arrogant will to apply them dogmatically, disregarding the different realities in different
countries and without a careful and concerned analysis of
their immediate consequences. Furthermore, often,
the obligations linked to "new" development
objectives and "new" policies to achieve them do not
even completely replace the previous ones but just add
onto them. This leads to an excess of bureaucratic
and formal procedures complicating the functioning of recipient countries, overwhelming field actors
with requests as useless as they are irritating and
slowing down the flow and the effectiveness of aid.
In the last few years many governments and the
same Breton Woods Institutions have acknowledged
the problems linked to conditionality, but this habit is
hard to disappear. The IMF and the World Bank keep imposing conditions (especially of economic
character) on the governments of recipient countries and
many donor countries approve, more or less
explicitly (OXFAM International, 2006).
We would like to end this paragraph with a quote
from a speech that President Ahmadou Toumani Touré
of Mali, delivered in 2005 at a forum on
development held in Washington and published in a short essay
by Oxfam International in 2006: "True
partnership supposes autonomy of beneficiary countries
in requesting aid and determining its objectives
Often programmes are imposed on us, and we are told it
is our programme
People who have never seen
cotton come to give us lessons on cotton
No one can
respect the conditionalities of certain donors. They are
so complicated that they themselves have
difficulty getting us to understand them. This is not
a partnership. This is a master relating to his
student" (Oxfam International, 2006). The short essay
sharply criticizes the enduring imposition of economic
policies by IMF and World Bank. At the same time,
it recommends the adoption of the so called
"outcome-based conditionality", linked to progress
made towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Very often, even
these "agreed upon" outcomes, irrespective of
their adequacy or achievability, are presented by donors
to recipients as "the outcomes you intend to
achieve".
In another document OXFAM and other
international organizations criticize the IMF and the WB not
only for the conditions they impose but, also, for
not evaluating their negative effects upon the poorest
strata of the population and for the total refusal to
take responsibility for the mistakes made and for
their consequences (OXFAM International, 2007a).
The relationship between donors and recipients is, by
its very nature, unbalanced. Conditionality will
never disappear.
. and promises never kept by donor countries
Donors not only impose conditions to
recipient countries. They also make a series of promises
and take a series of commitments on the amount of
aid, on the way this will be delivered and on the results that will be achieved. As William Easterly (a stern
critic of international aid) observes in his recent book,
rich countries have a strong tradition for pompous declarations and glorious objectives to be
achieved within time limits constantly moved forward
(Easterly, 2006).
We can quote the commitment, taken in 1977,
to ensure universal access to drinking water by
1990 (now moved to 2015), the one, taken in 1990,
to achieve universal primary school enrolment by
the year 2000 (this, too, moved to 2015). The list
could be painfully long. It is worthwhile to mention
the commitment taken by rich countries, in 1970,
to deliver, in aid, at least 0.7% of their GDP and the
one taken by the G8 countries, in July 2005, to double
aid to Africa by 2010.
The first, after almost 40 years, has been
achieved only by five countries; the second, according to
the World Bank, is far from being achieved since aid
to Africa, in perspective, does not seem likely to
increase (Word Bank, 2007). According to OXFAM, if
the current trends do not change, the G8 countries,
by 2010, will have disbursed in aid, US$ 30 billion
less than promised (OXFAM International, 2007b).
Declarations, conferences and round tables
The amount of aid is not the only important aspect.
It is also important the way in which it is disbursed
and used. Even in this respect donors' promises
and commitments flourish. One of the latest
declarations on these issues is the Paris Declaration on
aid effectiveness, delivered on March
2nd 2005 at the end of the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness,
started, in Paris, on February 28th of the same year
(Paris declaration, 2005). The signatories
(representatives of more than 100 governments of donors and
recipient countries and various international agencies,
including IMF, World Bank, United Nations, DAC,
Regional Development Banks _African, Asian, European
and Inter-American) committed themselves to
pursue higher aid effectiveness. Five major aspects
are mentioned: ownership, harmonization,
alignment, results and mutual accountability. None of
these concepts is new. In a way, it is symptomatic
that, after more than fifty years and US$ 2.3 trillion
spent in aid, these concepts must, once more, be dealt
with in solemn declarations and be the object of yet
"new" commitments. As the World Bank acknowledges,
the results achieved to respect the commitments taken
in Paris "
are poor" (World Bank, 2007).
The Paris Declaration has been preceded and
followed by other similar ones. It is explicitly inspired by the Declaration on Aid Harmonization made in Rome
in February 2003 and by the principles adopted in a
Round Table on Aid Management that took place in
Marrakech in February 2004. The same principles are
contained in many guidelines produced by the DAC, in the
notes to the eight of the MDGs and in many more documents, produced by as many
Conferences, Round Tables and For a, all of them, obviously,
of "High Level".
This plethora of declarations, where the
commitments taken and not respected in previous meetings
are recycled to become the body of following ones,
is depressing. Even the Secretary General of the
United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, stated flatly that "
the world does not want new promises
" and that it is
mandatory to keep those already made (Dept of Economic
and Social Affairs, UN, 2007).
Effectiveness: does aid help?
Aid effectiveness is an issue as important as it
is debated. Books and articles on it are
countless. Pessimistic views are more frequent and,
arguably, stronger, than optimistic ones. A useful synthesis
of the different positions is contained in an essay
written by Steven Radelet and published, in July 2006, by
the Center for Global Development (Radelet 2006).
Action Aid International published two reports, in 2005
and 2006, where it tried to quantify "real aid"
(effectively reaching poor people), and "phantom aid"
(counted as "aid" by donors but not reaching poor people:
either because it goes back where it came from or
because it is, literally, wasted). These estimates are,
often, debatable. Nevertheless, they are a bold attempt
in the right direction. According to Action Aid International, in 2004, about US$ 37 billion, that
is 47% of ODA from DAC countries for that year,
was "phantom aid"(Action Aid International, 2006).
More precisely, US $6.9 billion were not directed
to fight poverty, US $5.7 billion were counted twice
(as aid and as debt forgiveness), US $11.8 billion
were spent in TA not requested for, ineffective and
overpaid, US $2.5 billion were wasted because they were
linked to disadvantageous purchases of goods from
the donor country, US $8.1 billion were lost because
of lack of coordination between donors, US $2.1
billion were spent within the donor countries in
measures linked to immigration and at least 70 million went
in administrative costs (Action Aid International,
2006). As said, many of these estimates are,
somehow, arbitrary (as recognized by the authors
themselves), because of their complexity and because data
are scarce. It is nonetheless useful to mention
them because they contain useful elements deserving attention and reflection. Common sense suggests
that there is a need to monitor the activities
implemented with donor funds and to assess their impact. There
is also greater emphasis on the need to monitor not
just the activities but also their concrete results
(impact evaluation rather than process evaluation).
The Word Bank published a thick manual on how
to do it (World Bank 2004). In the manual, it is
clearly stated that it is not enough to verify that the
planned activities were carried out. It is equally necessary
to ascertain that the desired results have been
achieved. For instance, in the health sector, it is necessary
to ascertain that the activities delivered led to
decreased mortality levels. This sort of evaluation is
only apparently logic. In poor countries, with multiple
risks of disease and death, the results achieved in one
sector are strictly linked to those achieved, at the same
time, in other sectors. In order to reduce mortality
(infant, child, maternal, general) it is not enough to
expand the coverage of and the accessibility to health
services. Equally needed is progress in agricultural
techniques, education, water supply, transport, etc. To
evaluate the activities of a single project or programme in
a single sector, in isolation, may be misleading.
ODA and wider political coherence
ODA evaluation is, often, limited to the financial
flows and/or to the achievement of specific objectives.
This is a narrow approach.
A laudable effort to widen the scope of the
evaluation, making it much more meaningful, has been done,
in the last few years, by the Center for Global Development (CGD), a think tank based in
Washington DC. In 2003 the CGD introduced the Development Friendliness Index, later renamed Commitment to Development Index (CDI). This assesses policies
and actions of the countries studied in seven areas
all related to "human development" understood
as improvement of the quality of life of all the
members of a given population. ODA, assessed for
quantity and quality, is only one of the areas analyzed.
The others are: trade policies (in particular,
openness to poor countries' products), policies aimed
to promote investment in poor countries,
immigration policies, environmental policies, policies aimed
at improving global security (in particular,
contributions to United Nations peace-keeping operations in
terms of people and funds), policies aimed to promote
and expand research and use of new technologies (including pharmaceutical research
especially concerning the so called "neglected diseases"
mainly affecting poor people in poor countries).
In 2007 the CGD studied 21 of the 22 DAC
countries (the exception was Luxembourg) to assess their
overall political coherence to promote human
development. Not surprisingly, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Sweden and Norway topped this "league" (CDG 2007).
Conclusions
It seems reasonable to think that, for the
foreseeable future, the so called "aid system" will keep
muddling through the marshes of its contradictions,
illusions, delusions, failures and partial successes, as it did
for the last 50 years.
Nevertheless, something changed and keeps
changing. There is an increased awareness of the mistakes
made, of the incoherencies, of the hypocritical
and paternalistic arrogance, of the inefficiencies and
of the regrettable lack of responsibility and
accountability by many donors, agencies, organizations.
This increased awareness does not eliminate the
problems. To reform the "aid system" which is not a
"system" but a sort of cauldron where one can find
almost anything, from good to bad and worst, is a long
and slow process.
What remains is the unbearable injustice of
the iniquitous inequalities between those who have
and those who have not. It is the intrinsic goodness of
the idea that those who have must promote a change leading towards more justice, towards a more
bearable human condition for all.
To state that development aid failed to lift
poor countries to the desired levels of human
development is true and, at the same time, naïve and
narrow minded: development aid will never lift poor
countries to the desired levels of human development.
More realistically, if well used, it can contribute to do
it. The objective is too ambitious for a "system"
that mobilizes about US$ 100 billion per year (and
wastes about 40% of it).
In the conclusion to his book, Easterly launches
a devastating attack on aid because, after 50 years
"
twelve cent medicines do not reach children dying
of malaria
four-dollar bed nets do not get to the
poor to prevent malaria
" (Easterly, 2006). Such
levels of oversimplification are astonishing, especially
when they come from authors who, because of their experience and knowledge, should give us
much deeper and more articulated analyses. It is
certainly true that drugs and bed nets do not reach where
they should. But this is not the result of the failure
of development aid. Not only. This is the result of a
much wider and much more serious failure. To make sure that drugs and bed nets (and much, much more
) change the life and destiny of millions of people
who die of poverty, it is the fight against poverty that
must be fought and won. Aid is but a very small
instrument in this fight. Often, it is just a sort of alibi, a fig
leaf for governments and ordinary people in rich
countries to hide the shame of unbearable and unjust
inequalities. Aid is certainly not enough.
Much wider and coherent policies are needed, at
the international level. Policies embracing, as
briefly mentioned above, international trade and
investment, environmental protection and technical
innovation, migration and arms control. Condemning the
"aid system" for its inefficiency, corruption
and ineffectiveness is legitimate and, often, right. To
say that the inhuman conditions of life of billions of
people are a consequence of the failure of the "aid
system" is short-sighted in the best case and the
hypocritical search for an easy scapegoat in the worst.
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