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Journal of Medicine and Biomedical Research
College of Medical Sciences, University of Benin
ISSN: 1596-6941
Vol. 4, Num. 1, 2005, pp. 22-30
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Untitled Document
Journal of Medicine and Biomedical Research, Vol. 4, No. 1, June 2005, pp.
22-30
Obligation of non-maleficence: moral dilemma in physician-patient
relationship
Peter F Omonzejele
Correspondence: Peter F. Omonzejele, Department of Philosophy, University
of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria. Tel: 2348043271636, 2348043271722;
E-mail: pomonzejele@yahoo.com
Code Number: jm05003
ABSTRACT
This paper highlights the principle of non-maleficence from
sections of the Hippocratic oath and those entailed in various declarations
of medical ethics and conduct. The moral dilemmas associated with adherence
or efforts at adherence to the principle were indicated with the use of prepared
cases. The centrality of the paper is the moral conflict encountered by physicians
in their efforts at maintaining the fiduciary relationship that they have with
patients. The concepts of dignity, identity, harm and the definitions of brain
death as different from biological death, ordinary and extraordinary health
care and the principle of double effect were analysed in an attempt to resolve
the moral conflict in physician-patient relationship. Cost-benefit analysis,
detriment-benefit assessment and the notion of justice were also brought to
bear in the effort to resolve the moral dilemma in physician-patient relationship
as it borders on the obligation of non-maleficence.
KEY WORDS: Hippocrate, justice, ethics, physician, patient
INTRODUCTION
Relationships between two or more persons depict some sort
of connection that is beyond mere exchange of pleasantries or show of civility.
Rather, it indicates some sort of intimacy that usually emanates from contact
and communication. Relationships are freely developed amongst individuals such
as the cultivation of friendships and acquaintances, while other relationships
are not as freely cultivated. In contrast, they are determined, such as relationships
between brothers and sisters, cousins and relatives in general. Other
kinds of relationships could be entered
into as a result of the demands of professions and duties, as is the case with
the
physician-patient relationship.
In the course of duty and relationship with patients the physician
must adhere to certain principles of medical ethics (autonomy, non-maleficence,
beneficence and justice), rules (fidelity, confidentiality, privacy and veracity)
and virtues (compassion, kindness, respect, etc). A physician may be sanctioned
if he breaches the principles and rules of medical ethics, but he may not necessarily
be liable or compelled to uphold the virtues entailed in his line of practice
and duty. It is, however, morally upright (but not obligatory) for a good physician
to be compassionate, kind and to show respect for his/her patients. Respect
for patients and the wishes of patients are two different issues that must
not be confused.
The principles and rules of medical ethics are derived from
the Hippocratic oath and various declarations (Declaration of Geneva as amended
in Sydney 1968, Declaration of Tokyo 1975, Declaration of Oslo 1970, Declaration
of Helsinki 1975, etc) regulating medical practice. Despite the Hippocratic
oath and various declarations, a certain aspect (non-maleficence) of the oath
and declaration is sometimes breached in what seems to be
in the "interest" of patients in circumstances that constitute moral
dilemmas.
PRINCIPLE OF NON-MALEFICENCE
The physician-patient relationship is fiduciary. The patient
believes and trusts that the physician would apply his professional expertise
in his/her (the patient's) interest and benefit. Even more importantly, the
patient believes that his/her physicians (based on the principle of non-maleficence)
would do nothing to harm him/her. The principle of non-maleficence runs through
from the Hippocratic oath to current versions and amendments of medical ethics.
In the Hippocratic oath (in the translation preferred by the British Medical
Association), the aspect that is instructive and serves as guide to physicians
in respect of non-maleficemce states that:
I will follow that system of regimen, which, according
to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and
abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. I will give no deadly
medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel.
In the declaration of Geneva, and as amended in Sydney 1968,
physicians were expected and indeed mandated to:
... maintain the utmost respect for human life from the
time of conception; even under threat, ... not [to] use medical knowledge
contrary to the laws of humanity.
While the International Code of Medical Ethics (English text)
states that:
A doctor must always bear in mind the obligation of preserving
life.
In other words, the duty and obligations of physicians to
their patients remain unequi-vocally that of beneficence and non-maleficene.
The principle of non-maleficence revolves around the concept
of harm. Harm brings about pain and pain brings about distress. Harm may be
incidental, intended and intrinsic.1 According to Thomasma and Graber,
incidental harm is brought about through carelessness and negligence, intended
harm is calculated and inflicted pain, while intrinsic harm is such that harm
is directly brought about. They explained further that to kill a person deliberately
has the intrinsic effect of harming (the patient), thus it violates the negative
duty not to harm. Physicians' obligation not to harm is reflected in various
codes and declarations of medical ethics.
Non-maleficence in general, and medical non-maleficence in
particular, recommends that one ought not to inflict evil or harm.2 Albert
Jonsen in his work Do no Harm itemised medical non-maleficence into
four categories: physicians must (a) dedicate themselves to the well-being
(not harm) of patients; (b) provide adequate care; (c) properly assess the
situation, that is, risk/benefit analysis; and (d) make proper detriment-benefit
assessments.3 The physician's provision of `standard due care' is
central to the avoidance of harm. According to the American Law Reports, elements
inherent in due care may be said to be violated and harm inflicted when and
if the: (1) professional (physician) has a duty towards the affected party
(patient); (2) professional (physician) breached that duty; (3) the affected
party (patient) must experience a harm; and (4) this harm must be caused by
the breach of duty.4 Based on these elements, the obligation of
medical non-maleficence could be defined
as not imposing risks of harm as well as not inflicting actual
harm.5 Veatch explains further that it is the responsibility and duty
of physicians (and based on the fiduciary relationship between physician and
patient) to keep patients away from
harm.6 Mason and McCall Smith also indicated, in line with Veatch,
that based on their ability and knowledge, physicians must not engage in medical
procedures that may be harmful to their
patients.7 This is because, and based on, the obligation of non-maleficence,
the responsibility of
physicians is to maximise health and not to inflict harm.
In real life situations physicians do inflict harm on patients
but generally for the purpose of achieving some kind of good. According to
Beauchamp and Childress, a harm we inflict such as a surgical wound may be
negligible or trivial yet necessary to prevent a major harm such as death.8
Infliction of harm (that is, negligible harm) purposed at
arresting harm for the purpose of realising good does not constitute a moral
dilemma. This is because negligible harm is usually inflicted by physicians
based on detriment-benefit analysis in favour of patients. However, infliction
of harm is not always negligible. Sometimes, and increasingly regularly, physicians
inflict fatal harm with the use of double effect medications in what seems
to be in the patient's interest as well as to his/her benefit. The moral dilemma
is this: could the infliction of fatal harm that breaches the obligation of
non-maleficence ever be in the interest and benefit of patients?
The principle of double effect attempts to differentiate intended
and non-intended effects of an action. The intended effect is good and primary;
however, associated with the intended effect is the necessary but bad and unintended
(secondary) effect. According to Beauchamp and Childress, the principle of
double effect must satisfy certain conditions for it to be morally justifiable,
and these conditions are:
1. The action itself (independent of its
consequences) must not be intrinsically wrong (it must be morally good or at
least morally neutral).
2. The agent must intend only the good effect and not the
bad effect. The bad effect can be foreseen, tolerated and permitted but must
not be intended; it is therefore allowed but not sought.
3. The bad effect must not be a means to the end of bringing
about good effect, that is, the good effect must be achieved directly by the
action and not by the way of the bad effect.
4. The good result must outweigh the evil permitted, that
is, there must be propor-tionality or favourable balance between the good and
bad affects of the action.9
Beauchamp and Childress explained further that some ethicists
currently emphasise some of these conditions while they downplay others. However,
traditional moralists still require that all conditions should and must be
met before double effect treatments may be justified. It is important to state
that the conditions indicated for the justification of double effect treatments
have not eliminated the moral dilemma associated with the principle, as it
pertains to the physician-patient relationship and the obligation of non-maleficence.
MORAL DILEMMA
In order to address the question raised, that is, if the infliction
of fatal harm could ever be in the interest of the patient, it is appropriate
and for proper comprehension to use prepared cases. This situates the moral
dilemma with which physicians are faced in real life circumstances.
Case one
Okeke suffered from advanced and terminal skin cancer, which
had resulted in extensive destruction of his body. He was constantly in
acute pain. If his physicians continued
with the current and standard line of treatment,
he would live for about a year and probably more, but all the time he would be
in acute and unrelenting pain. However, and to
relieve Okeke of pain and suffering, his
physicians (based on Okeke's consent) decided to
give doses of strong pain killers that had the unintended effect (principle of
double effect) of shortening Okeke's life span by about
six months. Harm inflicted on Okeke (though unintended) seemed to contravene
the obligation of non-maleficence, which was indicated in the Hippocratic
Oath (and
other amendments and declarations) that: "I will give no deadly medicine
to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsels." Herein lies the moral
dilemma associated with double effects medical treatments (such as Okeke's).
The argument usually made in favour of physicians when they
help to relieve pain and suffering with double effect drugs that hasten death
is that it is the physician's obligation to alleviate pain and suffering. Patients
(and indeed everyone) have the right not to suffer when it can be avoided.
According to Cassell, it was the responsibility of physicians to manage pain
and suffering of terminally ill patients.10 Liebeskind and Melzack
posit further that by any reasonable code, freedom from pain should be a basic
human right, limited only by our knowledge to achieve it.11
Pellegrino indicates that relief of pain should not generate
much moral debate, arguing that if a physician is unable to achieve cure he
should at least be able to relieve suffering.12 The inference is
that it is unfortunate, if in the physician's efforts to alleviate pain and
suffering, some kind of harm (even if fatal and unintended) may be inflicted
on patients. Physicians cannot, therefore, be held morally responsible as their
first line of duty to patients is to relieve pain and suffering. Perhaps it
should also be added that double effect treatments (as in the case of Okeke)
do not just relieve pain but also enable patients die (even if death was hastened)
in
dignity. Dignity is an integral part of
all humans that must be retained at any point of our existence, even at the moment
of death.
However, it is argued on the other side of the divide that
physicians must at all times adhere to the code of medical ethics not to inflict
harm, that is, the obligation of non-maleficence. Based on Kant's duty ethics,
it is argued that what is good is good in itself, since good is without qualification.13 Perhaps,
this argument could be pursued further to state that what is good (if it is
really good and good in itself) cannot and is not capable of producing evil,
except if the good was corrupted, in which case it was not really good in the
first instance. In other words, it is wrong to inflict harm (even if unintended)
whatever the reason(s) for the primary and initial intension. This is because
what is good is unconditionally good, hence, action done from duty has its
moral worth, not from the results it attains or seeks to attain, but from a
formal principle of doing one's duty whatever that duty may be.14
The duty and responsibility physicians owe to patients and
society is to do well (beneficence) and not to inflict harm (maleficence).
Ironically, Kantian ethics could also be used the other way round to support
the principle of double effect (infliction of harm) if one focused on just
duty or act and ignored the consequences in line with deontological ethical
theories. This is because (and according to Kant) our actions have moral worth
in themselves, in which case it would seem that only physicians' intended actions
should be morally evaluated in double effect treatments and the unintended
consequence (e.g., hastened death) should be ignored as of no moral consequence
or even relevance.
Christian moralists urged strict physicians to adhere to the
obligation of non-maleficence based on their perception of freedom. According
to this perception, man does not have the freedom to decide when to return
back to his creator, as no one (neither physician
nor patient) ought to play
God.15 Hence, it was morally wrong for any human to decide to embrace
death, or for anyone to assist someone else in embracing death when God has not
occasioned or determined it. They therefore argued in addition that human life
is sacred and must not be terminated, that pain and suffering are not enough
reasons for anyone to play the role of the
creator.16 Based on Christian theology, meaning could be derived from
pain and suffering, as suffering gives man the opportunity to participate in
the suffering of Christ.17 However, eastern theological perspectives
(Buddhism, Confu-cianism, Hinduism, etc) are not in agreement with the views
expressed by most Christian moralists. They support and encourage physicians
to relieve pain and suffering by whatever means, even if such medications have
the unintended effect of hastening death. In most traditional African religions,
pain and suffering are to be stoically endured to the very end. This may be connected
with the strong belief in reincarnation, ancestral worships and second burial
rites. Anyone who hastens his/her death, or gives consent for his/her death to
be hastened, is not entitled to second burial rites and would consequently not
be allowed into the ancestral realm.
Case two
Bode, a 50-year-old truck driver, was involved in a near fatal
accident, and although Bode survived, his brain artery was ruptured. Bode was
taken to a teaching hospital where he underwent unsuccessful surgery. He eventually
slipped into coma and persistent vegetative state (PVS). Bode's family members
consented to gastronomy for him. PVS patients could survive on life support
equipment for many years without hope of regaining consciousness. After a few
days, Bode's family members thought it was senseless for their loved one to
remain in this state. According to one of his family members, he was neither
alive nor dead. Hence, they
requested that his physicians withdraw
the feeding tubes and other life support equipment
so that he could be given a befitting burial in line with African burial rites.
These very important rites cannot be undertaken while he remains on life support.
After
the physicians reviewed Bode's case, they obliged the request of his family members
and withdrew the life support equipment and he died quietly. The moral question
is: Did
Bode's physicians breach the obligation of non-maleficence? Surrogate decision-making,
as was the case in Bode's situation, or advance directives such as a living
will, if Bode
had made his decision known while he was healthy, do not change the moral
question inherent in withholding and withdrawing
life support fluids and equipment from PVS patients.
What is crucial in responding to any alleged breach of the
obligation of non-maleficence (as in Bode's case) should start from the concept
of personhood in relation to PVS patients. Persons have certain values, rights
and privileges by the very nature of their personhood. These values, rights
and privileges are not usually associated with non-human beings such as animals.
Hence, in analysing the concept of person, Edge and Grooves asked, "What
types of beings can be thought of as humans."18 In response,
Fletcher and Feinberg provided an answer as to what they thought were the criteria
that qualify a person as a bearer of rights, which are:
(a) Possession of certain beliefs, values and intuitive awareness.
(b) One for whom something could be in his/her interest.
(c) Possession of the concept of time, that is, of past, present
and future.
(d) Ability for social interactions with others.19 20
In other words, when these vital criteria are no longer present
in humans, they do not have rights and privileges usually associated
with persons; in which case physicians
may not be considered to have breached the obligation of non-maleficence when
they either withhold or withdraw life support from PVS patients. However, it
is not in dispute or
in contention that the physician has inflicted harm, whether compassionate or
unintended harms. It contravenes the International
Code of Medical Ethics, which states that "... a physician must always bear
in mind the obligation of preserving human life." Moral dilemma once again
surfaces in physician-patient relationship.
Efforts at resolving the moral dilemma in withholding and
withdrawing life support for PVS patients may be found in the definition of
death. Death may be defined from two perspectives: brain stem death and biological
death. Brain death may be defined as a condition of unreceptivity and unrespon-siveness,
no movement or breathing, no reflexes and flat EEG of confirmatory value.21 However,
brain dead patients could be sustained on life support equipment, such as a
ventilator, feeding tubes, IV fluids, for years. In which case biological organs
remain functional in so far as life supports remain in place and not withdrawn,
but the patient would never regain consciousness. The moment artificial life
support equipment is removed the patient dies biologically. In other words,
biological death is when bodily organs cease to function. It means one could
lose intuitive awareness in its entirety (brain death) and yet retain some
sort of existence that could be sustained artificially. It is the inability
to definitely resolve the concept of death that gears some physicians to resort
to extraordinary care while others do not and the moral dilemma remains. What
is to be done?
To resolve the question, it is mandatory for one to demarcate
where ordinary care ends and when extraordinary care begins. Perhaps this would
assist physicians to arrive at decisions regarding withholding and withdrawing
life support. Loosely defined, ordinary health care has to be beneficial and
must
be made available. According to Pope Pius
XII, life may be prolonged with the use of ordinary care, subject to the circumstances
of persons, places, time and culture. He explained further that ordinary health
care should
not constitute grave burden to self or another. While extraordinary health care,
which may involve intravenous fluids, nasogastric feedings, etc, for PVS patients
may be
regarded as optional, ordinary care may be regarded
as obligatory. It would seem that extraordinary care begins where ordinary care
has become useless and of no benefit. It seems,
however, that the demarcation of ordinary care
from extraordinary does not really resolve the moral dilemma inherent in the
physician's obligation of non-maleficence in
physician-patient relationship, as what
constitutes extraordinary care still remains unclear.
For instance, what may constitute extraordinary care in developing countries
may be
regarded as ordinary care in developed countries.
Case three
Omole, seven days old, with extensive physical deformities
coupled with severe mental retardation and other health complications was born
to Mr. and Mrs. Kimba. The couple had no formal education and were casual factory
workers who earned about N 20,000 a month (about US$150) with
which they sustained themselves and their three children (besides Omole) aged
five, seven and nine years. According to Omole's physicians, if he was kept
on special diet and given monitored health care, all the while he must remain
in hospital, he would probably have lived to his fifth birthday but not more.
The Kimbas would be required to pay about N 15,000 a month
(about US$115) for Omole's upkeep and health care (Nigeria and indeed most
African countries have no national health insurance schemes). If Omole must
live to see his 5th birthday, the options open to the Kimbas are: (a) sustain
Omole in hospital, in which case their other children must have
to drop out of school, move to a
one-bedroom apartment and considerably reduce the
quality and quantity of their diet; (b) request
that the physicians allow Omole to die since (i) Omole could never really live
a normal life, and (ii) his brief existence would only
bring more grief and distress for everyone, that
is, to himself and family members. The Kimbas decided to take option B, which
they communicated to Omole's physicians. The physicians consented to his
parents' request, medication was discontinued and Omole
died two days later. Could Omole's physicians be said to have breached the obligation
of
non-maleficence?
Attempts to make a moral judgment of the physicians' role
in Omole's death should take into account the concept of justice based on utilitarian
and Kantian ethics. From a Kantian perspective, an action is morally evaluated
to be just if approval of that action could be universalised for everyone.22 While
utilitarian ethics focuses on the greatest happiness for the greatest number
in evaluating moral and just actions, the idea of justice in traditional, and
to a great extent contemporary, Africa is essentially interpersonal and social
with a basis in human welfare.23 In the light of these definitions,
was Omole justly treated? Omole's physicians may have acquiesced to Omole's
parents because it was the just thing to do based on utilitarian ethics, which
promotes the interest of the majority over that of the minority; in this case,
the welfare of Omole's parents and siblings over Omole's welfare.
The physicians' position and judgment may be further strengthened
based on the low quality of Omole's life. Again, in line with classical utilitarianism,
they may have evaluated that it would be morally wrong for the Kimbas to sustain
Omole's interest (an individual who would with luck on his side probably live
to see his fifth birthday) over those of five persons. This is because, for
Omole's sake, his siblings would not only have to drop out of school; their
lives may also
be in danger from malnutrition. The
physicians may even stretch their arguments further,
that it is morally wrong for Omole's siblings to
bear the consequences of their parents' decision to prolong Omole's life, and
if anyone must bear the consequences it should be the couple alone and not
their children
(Omole's siblings). Their children's interests should
not be undermined if they decided to bear the consequences of prolonging Omole's
life, and since it seemed that nothing could be done without undermining the
interests of
Omole's siblings, then Omole should be allowed to
die in order to protect the interests of the other children. Consequently, the
physicians may have concluded that they acted justly and morally under the
circumstances.
However, it is not in doubt that Omole's
physicians inflicted harm, even if on
compassionate grounds, hence, the moral dilemma remains.
CONCLUSION
Efforts at resolving the moral conflict or dilemma associated
with PVS patients must be accompanied with conscious efforts at resolving the
lacuna that exist between brain death and biological death. Without bridging
this lacuna, the moral dilemma associated with withholding and withdrawing
artificial life support for PVS patients would always remain contentious as
far as the physician's obligation of non-maleficence remains total and binding
on all physicians under all circumstances, that he shall respect human life
and studiously avoid doing it harm.24 Perhaps it should be added
that even if the developed world with functional and viable health insurance
schemes could afford almost indefinitely to sustain PVS patients on life support,
it would be morally wrong for physicians in developing countries, where health
resources are scarce, to embark on extraordinary healthcare, when the same
resources could be more beneficially used for ordinary care in line with cost-benefit
analysis. This means that physicians in
developing countries are confronted
with harsher forms of moral dilemmas than their counterparts in the developed
countries
if they must adhere in totality to the obligation of non-maleficence.
On the use of double effect medications in relieving pain
and suffering, it might be necessary to know the innate quality of human life
in general and particularly the quality of human life at the moment of death.
This is because the breach of the obligation of non-maleficence is sometimes
based on the concept of dignity and identity, which must be retained even at
the moment of death since mental suffering often accompanies physical pain
in terminal illnesses such as cancer.25 According to Weisman and
Hackett, it is the responsibility of physicians to help the dying patient preserve
his/her identity and dignity as a unique individual despite the disease, or,
in some cases, because of it.26 But the recurring question remains:
could a physician be held morally, if not legally, liable when in the course
of duty he breaches the obligation of non-maleficence? It seems the moral dilemma
remains: whichever way the pendulum swings, the physician must at all times
be conscious of the dictum: aegroti salus suprema lex (that is, the
good of the patient is the highest law).27
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