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Journal of Postgraduate Medicine, Vol. 52, No. 2, April-June, 2006, pp. 110-115 Symposium Complex humanitarian emergencies: A review of epidemiological and response models Burkle FrederickM Department of Public Health Sciences and Epidemiology, Asia-Pacific Center for Biosecurity, Disaster and Conflict Research John A. Burns School of Medicine University of Hawaii Code Number: jp06035 Abstract Complex emergencies (CEs) have been the most common human-generated disaster of the past two decades. These internal conflicts and associated acts of genocide have been poorly understood and poorly managed. This article provides an epidemiological background and understanding of developing and developed countries, and chronic or smoldering countries' CEs, and explains in detail the prevailing models of response seen by the international community. Even though CEs are declining in number, they have become more complex and dangerous. The UN Charter reform is expected to address internal conflicts and genocide but may not provide a more effective and efficient means to respond.Keywords: Aid, armed conflict, complex emergency, disaster epidemiology, humanitarian assistance A complex emergency (CE) is defined by the United Nations (UN) as a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country program.[1] Those suffering the consequences of the violence are primarily civilians (50-90%) and especially vulnerable populations of that include children, women, the elderly, and the disabled. Since 1995, when internal armed conflicts numbered 45 annually, CEs have been declining in number. In 2003, they numbered 37 with more than 80% occurring in Asia and Africa. Crisis monitoring systems evaluate political and humanitarian indices to determine conflict trends. Countries at risk for crisis are divided into those deteriorating, improved, and unchanged, and recorded on a monthly basis. In mid-2005, 64 conflict-situation countries were unchanged, 8 deteriorated, and 2 improved. One country, Somalia, known for its protracted violence in early 1990s, currently shows evidence of a seriously worsening condition with escalating violence and loss of life, threatening the fragile peace.[2] Humanitarian assistance is the aid to an affected population, which serves as its primary purpose to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality. The majority of assistance is in keeping with the recovery and rehabilitation of basic public health infrastructure required both by civilian and military-aid providers under mandates of the international humanitarian law. These humanitarian aid missions have, in the recent past, been primarily focused on refugee and internally displaced populations (IDPs), most often in rural settings. In the last decade, rural populations, especially in Asia and Africa, have moved to urban areas, seeking security and social services. Currently, over 67% of the Africans live in cites. Urban public health infrastructure demands are more complex and have not kept up with the growing and increasingly dense urban populations. Consequently, humanitarian assistance is moving to urban centers; yet no humanitarian agency or organization possesses the capabilities and the capacity to support the type and complexity of public health infrastructure recovery required in urban settings. Humanitarian aid is most effectively delivered by civilian humanitarian agencies under the UN leadership. The core competencies for military involvement in CEs is in (1) providing security for relief efforts, (2) enforcing negotiated settlements, (3) providing security for noncombatants, and (4) employing logistical capabilities.[3] Situations requiring humanitarian assistance since the turn of the century have been plagued by increasing security demands. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, extreme insecurity has limited civilian agencies′ability to work. If there is an occupation, as there is in Iraq, the Fourth Geneva Convention obliges occupying forces to ensure the supply of food and other essential services. Military forces must be prepared to provide aid if it is too insecure for civilian agencies to operate. As soon as conditions allow, civilian agencies under the UN leadership should provide that assistance.[4] In Iraq, this has been problematic for the US and Coalition forces and since the start of the 2003 war there has been scant presence of the UN and NGO communities. Assessing CEs has been a difficult task. There are similarities but also major differences in the manner in which CEs present themselves, as well as the kind of response put forward by the international community. This article will provide an epidemiological view into CEs in three categories and will discuss three prominent but highly different ways of response. Measuring severity It is important for all planners and decision-makers to know who is dying in CEs. Initial assessments may report only crude death rates that indicate the rates for all age groups. The under-the-age-of-five death rate becomes critically important in assessing the impact of food shortages and infectious diseases on children, especially in developing countries. Increased under-the-age-of-five death rates compared with the overall crude death rate help identify that children are indeed more vulnerable than the rest of the population, and critical resources need to be channeled in their direction. On the other hand, a sudden or sustained genocidal aggression against civilian targets raises the adult death rates in comparison with children aged under 5 years.[5] Aid agencies will focus on rapid assessments to identify where their resources will do the best in saving lives and preventing further morbidity. As the basis of assessments performed, these indices help in identifying needs, prioritizing interventions, monitoring impact of aid, and revealing requirements for political and humanitarian advocacy programs. Rapid epidemiological assessment sampling methods are tools, based on standardized minimum essential data sets, used to assess the essential services required for survival (i.e., health, water, food, sanitation, and shelter).[6],[7] Although these initial indices serve as broad indicators of the severity and nature of the conflict, overtime, additional epidemiological indices, and other variables will be necessary to clarify planning and response management. NGOs and UN agencies will gather additional age and gender indices, such as infant and maternal death rates, during their surveys and surveillance studies, to better assess the reality on the ground. This is the so-called ground truth that is necessary to identify the extent of vulnerable populations. In the absence of minimum standard data on essential indicators, humanitarian aid will neither be effective nor efficient. Emergency aid organizations will be expected to report indicator measures at daily planning and management meetings-the latter as a part of the information-sharing process and transition to NGOs and other humanitarian groups focused on sustainable development. Epidemiological models It is understood that populations will flee the violence within the country. In general, once the population crosses a border, resides in a conflict-free refugee camp, and is protected by services provided by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian groups, the death rates and other indices will improve. However, this is not so for IDPs (who must fend for themselves), which experience the highest of death rates among fleeing victims of violence. Understandably, among the IDPs, the subgroups of unaccompanied minors and orphans will experience death rates 100-800 times the baseline. Developing country model The epidemiological pattern will result in overall high crude death rates, with the majority coming from under-the-age-of-five deaths. Additional age and gender death rates will further define the nature and extent of vulnerability. Smoldering or chronic country model This model will show death rates comparatively higher in the under-the-age-of-five population. However, with the recent violence in the Sudan, the adult population suffered high and violent death rates, fleeing rebel forces. Once refugees reached the "relative" safety of camps, high under-the-age-of-five death rates again peaked from inadequate public health protections and communicable diseases. Developed country model In this model, high crude death rates will be expected as adults die from war-related injuries. There will be comparatively low under-the-age-of-five death rates if public health protections remain intact. However, in Kosovo, age- and gender-specific studies showed excess deaths rates in patriarchal males and young males of military age. These studies have been used as Hague war crime trial evidence of age- and gender-targeted ethnic cleansing.[11] The longer a developed country model CE is allowed to go, the more severe the effects on public health infrastructure and access. The health profiles begin to deteriorate and merge with those characteristically seen in the developing and chronic smoldering country models. Response models Background By late 1999, and after a decade of silence in favor of unrestricted sovereignty of nations by previous SGs of the UN, SG Annan declared that a nation′s "sovereignty" could only be guaranteed under Article 2 of the UN Charter if governments protected all people under their charge. Even so, every new complex internal event requires debate and redebate within the Security Council and no action to intervene has ever been unanimously supported. In justifying Security-Council-sanctioned military intervention in internal conflicts, intervention has been reserved as an option only in situations of ongoing or imminent slaughter (genocide).[13] If justified, military action must be:
Despite the complexity of this UN bureaucratic process, supporters of the UN claim that by providing humanitarian action under the umbrella of the UN it provides a means to:[13]
A critical barrier to a timely response to a conflict is that it takes 4-6 months to mobilize a UN force from willing members. The initial UN Charter, which in 1945 called for a UN Standing Task Force under Article 43 has never been implemented, leaving the UN dependent on UN member state forces. Even with the projected UN reform, there is little support for an Article-43-like force ready to respond, leaving the responsibility first to regional security and economic organizations such as the African Union, Organization of American States, and ASEAN. Multinational response model
PK interventions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter include the use of observers and civilian personnel to monitor an accord or agreement and the deployment of PK troops or civil police. Unfortunately, PK forces have enjoyed only limited success in controlling fragile peace processes before a formal peace agreement is signed. PE forces have recently been used exclusively by the UN because the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia revealed failures of the strict PK model. This model, albeit evolving over time, is based on the "right to intervene" and requires military intervention to stop the violence, reduce civilian mortality and morbidity, and strictly monitor human rights and international humanitarian law abuses until safe enough for the UN Agencies, NGOs, and international relief organizations to enter the theater of war. PE deployment to areas of conflict (e.g., Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor, and Liberia) characterizes the evolution of intervention as moving purely from one of humanitarian assistance to recognition that nothing is resolved without a political solution, which may necessitate the added provision of military security and protection. UN Coalition military duties are usually limited to providing:
Once a peace agreement or accord is signed, a transition to a Chapter VI (PK) force is prescribed. UN Agencies are independent of the Secretary General (SG) and the General Assembly and function under mandates to meet humanitarian needs under existing international law. The emergency responsibilities of these agencies have expanded tremendously over the past two decades owing to CEs. Major agencies are:
NGOs are defined by their voluntary, independent, and not-for-profit status. They are the major component of the aid system that directly represents the recipients or beneficiaries of aid in the field. NGOs vary in size, mission, and capability. They may specialize in water and sanitation, and food, health, shelter, and focus on specific vulnerable groups with specific skill sets for therapeutic feeding centers or reproductive health. Advocacy NGOs promote and monitor human rights′protections and support efforts to uncover and record abuses. NGOs specializing in humanitarian relief have grown in number from 28 in the Kurdish crisis in northern Iraq to over 700 in Haiti.[7] Increasingly, NGOs provide the bulk of humanitarian assistance in the field. Over 90% of aid coordinated by the UN is provided by NGOs. Private voluntary organizations (PVOs) are private, nonprofit organizations involved in relief and development activities. InterAction, which represents over 160 US-based NGOs, is an example. Red Cross movement is an international organization that includes the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), an all-Swiss private institution mandated to respond, under international law (Geneva Conventions), to victims of war and conflict. The ICRC is the largest and oldest of humanitarian organizations and will be involved wherever internal conflict or war occurs. The ICRC functions under the authority of the Geneva Conventions as a neutral intermediary to protect all victims. The ICRC has a unique mandate to monitor the treatment of prisoners and to assist in finding, tracing, and protecting those missing because of conflict. In the last decade, the ICRC has increasingly become a target for attacks. The Movement also includes the Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), which represent the interests of national societies worldwide. IFRC primarily deals with national disasters and assists refugees outside the area of conflict. With the termination of conflict, the ICRC will transfer many duties to the IFRC. Because of personnel shortages, frequently, IFRC-aid workers will be seconded to the ICRC during CEs. Civil-Military Coordination
Donor Countries: Primarily representing western industrial nations, donor country agencies provide the bulk of funding to UN and NGOs and yield a great deal of political power in determining the direction of humanitarian aid. In recent years, they have mandated improved evaluation of the programs they support, including use of outcome indicators. The US Agency for International Development (USAID), its counterpart in Australia (AusAID), and JICO in Japan are some examples. Unilateral and coalition response mode With the unexpected collapse of the Iraqi health system and other services from looting and worsening security, little emphasis could be placed by the Department of Defense on recovery of essential services mandated under the Geneva Conventions. Reconstruction projects designed to install water and sewage pipe, remove and landfill solid waste, generate short-term employment, and immediately improve the lives of the population were delayed. Immediate postconflict aid initiatives were directed at contractor driven large-scale infrastructure reconstruction projects. This approach faltered but gained success only when the coalition military began to work with the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) who have trained experts in postconflict transitions. This combined a quick-response capability (military) with USAID′s seasoned expertise in dealing with local hires and other cross-cultural necessities such as facilitating needed jobs into the community. Owing to security problems, few NGOs and UN agencies have established a strong presence in Iraq. Under international law, extreme insecurity may limit civilian agencies′ability to work. This has been the case in Iraq with NGOs and UN agencies. International law obliges occupation forces to ensure the supply of food and other essential services until it is secure enough for the civilian agencies to enter the country.[16] International collective security model
Under these circumstances, the UN would:
Although not yet an operational reality, it is anticipated that UN reform will address these policy and operational requirements outlined in the Collective Security Model. Limitations to existing response models
Forces from UN member states offered for Chapter VI and VII operations usually are infantry level forces lacking logistical, transport, communications, engineering, and medical and public components critical to military force support and humanitarian operations in support of civilian action. The anticipated UN Charter reform may or may not fully address all issues confronting humanitarian intervention within a sovereign nation. Concern regarding the potential of the collective security model is that it will not be value-added unless critical reform in the UN Charter is realized. Without an Article-43-implemented UN Standing Task Force, military requirements from donor countries for UN missions will remain unchanged. Concerns of the unilateral model are that humanitarian needs of the occupied country have not been met because the war remains active and security issues prevent repair of essential services. Few, if any, indices other than performance indicators are being recorded and monitored. This compromises an accurate assessment of the progress of the occupation aid efforts. However, it currently appears that a unilateral approach may continue to occur as a vehicle of response in future crises. References
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